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We explore complementarities between parents’ investment in their children’s hu-
man capital and firms’ investment in physical capital as a determinant of child labor
and schooling in developing economies. In the first essay, we develop a theoretical
model where human and physical capital investments are shown to be decreasing in
firms’ cost of investing in skill-biased capital, increasing in the quality of education,
and decreasing in the cost of education. Our contribution is two-fold. First, when
there is a unique equilibrium, there is an unambiguous improvement in the welfare
of all agents in response to policies that improve the quality of education or lower
the cost of education or skill-biased capital. Second, this welfare improvement can be
achieved by policies that target only a proportion of workers or firms.
In the second essay, we test the theoretical proposition that human capital in-
vestments respond to changes in the returns to education in India. Using National
Sample Survey data, we first estimate the rates of return to primary, middle, high
school, and college education for males and females in each Indian state for four sep-
arate years - 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999. The response of children’s participation in
child labor and schooling to the rates of return to primary and middle school is then
examined. We find that child labor amongst both boys and girls, falls in response
to higher rates of return to education. However, only boys’ participation in school
increases in response to higher rates of return to education.
In the third essay, we first examine changes in relative wages and returns to edu-
cation in India from 1983 to 1999, which coincides with India’s liberalization of trade
and investment. We then conduct a simple demand and supply analysis using the
non-parametric method proposed by Katz & Murphy (1992) to examine alternative
explanations for changes in relative wages in India. We find that relative demand
changes contributed significantly to changes in relative wages and that international
trade in manufactures predicts increases in the relative demand for both high-skilled
men and women.
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We explore the relationship between capital-skill complementarities, the returns to
education, and child labor and schooling in developing economies. In the first essay
we develop a theoretical model where parents’ human capital investment decisions
for their children and firms’ physical capital investment decisions respond to changes
in three factors - the cost of investing in skill-biased capital for firms, the cost of
education, and the quality of education available to children, via the expected returns
to education and firms’ investment in skill-biased capital.1
Policies that lower the cost of skill-biased capital or the cost of education or those
that improve the quality of education for just a proportion of agents results in an
increase in all agents’ investments and expected returns, leading to an unambiguous
welfare improvement for all agents. Despite a constant returns to scale production
technology, we show that the equilibrium rate of return to human and physical capital
1In our model, physical capital embodies technology because it is factor biased. We refer to
skill-biased technology not as a traditional exogenous technological parameter (A) but instead to
the production technology embodied in physical capital. A lower level of capital is synonymous
with unskill-biased machinery (the use of unskilled-labor-biased production technology) while a
higher level of capital represents skill-biased machinery (the use of skilled-labor-biased production
technology).
1
are increasing not only in the average human capital of the workforce but also in the
average physical capital of firms, a la Acemoglu (1996). In this sense, there are social
increasing returns to investments in human and physical capital which are pecuniary
rather than technological in nature. The results are driven by a combination of ex-
ante investments in human and physical capital and costly bilateral search in the
labor market.
Low levels of human capital investments in developing countries have been at-
tributed primarily to poverty. Poor parents rely critically on their children’s incomes
in order to survive. The absence of social welfare systems and access to credit in most
developing economies further exacerbates the problem. Even though poverty, credit
constraints, and the absence of social welfare systems are cited as the major cause of
child labor and low levels of education, these are not the only and often not the most
significant determinants of these phenomena. There is evidence from several devel-
oping countries that often very poor children attend school while relatively better-off
children work.2
This observation points to other determinants of high child labor and low educa-
tion in poor countries. The lack of enforcement of anti-child labor and compulsory
education laws is often cited as a crucial determinant of child labor and education.
The monetary and political costs of enforcing such laws are too high for many gov-
ernments. Lobbying by employers of child workers and the fear of losing votes from
households of displaced children create political pressures that discourage govern-
ments from enforcing these laws. Lack of awareness of these laws on the part of
employers and parents also contributes to high child labor and low education.
2Bhalotra & Heady (2003) find that the daughters of land-rich households are more likely to
work than the daughters of land-poor households in both Ghana and Pakistan. They refer to this
phenomena as the ‘wealth paradox’.
2
The social dimension is equally important in driving high levels of child labor
and low levels of education. Parental attitudes are highly interdependent: what one
person thinks about the value of education is strongly influenced by others’ views on
this within their family, community, or village. Moreover, the custom amongst many
families and communities of sending their children to school for only a few years and
then to work to learn skills, is a consequence not of poverty but of social norms.
Yet another explanation for low human capital investments is that parents often
see no economic benefit from educating their children. The scarcity of jobs and low
wages for educated workers results in low economic returns to education.3
In addition to low economic returns to education, the returns to child labor may
be high. Not only are skilled jobs scarce in developing countries, but also securing
a skilled job depends more on economic status and family connections rather than
3There is conflicting evidence on the returns to education in LDCs. Some researchers find rel-
atively high returns to education in LDCs while others find no consistent pattern between growth
or development and the returns to education. In Psacharopoulos (1994) returns to education (par-
ticularly for primary schooling) are found to be highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Latin
America/Caribbean, Asia, and non-OECD Europe/Middle East/North Africa. The returns to ed-
ucation are found to be lowest in OECD countries. The comparison of vastly different educational
systems across countries and the choice of countries could affect the estimated returns to education
in cross-country studies. Bennell (1996) argues that with chronically internal and external inefficien-
cies at all education levels in most Sub-Saharan African countries, it seems highly implausible that
rates of return to education are higher than in advanced countries. Denny et al. (2001) find that
the returns to education are high in some developed countries (Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and
The Republic of Ireland) and low in others (Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Germany, and Sweden),
but cannot find any pattern for transition or developing countries. There are relatively few studies
that estimate the returns to education over time within a single developing country. Nielson &
Westergard-Nielson (1998) find extremely low returns to primary education and higher returns to
secondary education in Zambia.
3
academic merit and experience. As a result, poor parents often believe their children
are better off working and securing an unskilled job as children since they will never
have the opportunity to secure skilled jobs as adults. Many parents believe educa-
tion to be a worthless endeavor due to a low quality of education and inaccessible
schools. This reinforces parents’ beliefs that their children are better off acquiring
skills through employment rather than via formal education. Many schools that cater
to poor children have too few and incapable teachers and lack adequate teaching fa-
cilities so that children barely learn to read and write in primary school (grades 1
through 5). Inadequate infrastructure and transport facilities, together with too few
and inaccessible schools, further discourages parents from educating their children.
Our argument - that the cost of skill-biased capital, the cost of education, and
the quality of education determine the expected returns to education and firms’ in-
vestment in skill-biased capital - relies on several observations. First, insufficient
employment opportunities for educated workers as a result of inadequate investment
in skill-biased capital and technology by firms results in low returns to education in
many developing countries (Foster & Rosenzweig 1996). Second, in an environment
where children’s time has an economic value, the opportunity cost of education (fore-
gone wages from child labor) may be high (Rosenzweig 1990). Third, a low quality
of education or bad access to schools further discourages education (The Probe Team
1999). Finally, it is risky for firms to invest in skill-biased capital in regions with low
human capital (Lucas 1988, 1990).
The interaction between firms’ production technology and workers’ human capital
is an important one that has been insufficiently explored in the existing literature on
child labor. Three forms of complementarities are explored in this paper. First, each
parent’s investment in his child’s education is increasing in other parents’ investments
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in their children’s education. Second, each firm’s investment in skill-biased capital is
increasing in other firms’ investments in skill-biased capital. Finally, each parent’s
investment in his child’s education is increasing in all firms’ investments in skill-biased
capital.
The idea that capital-skill complementarities will affect parents’ human capital in-
vestments in their children and firms’ physical capital investments is simple. Parents’
and firms’ expectations of the returns to their investments in the future affect their
present investment decisions. An individual’s incentive to forego current income and
invest in education depends on the wage differential between better and less educated
labor (the returns to education) and on the probability of finding employment that
adequately rewards the skills achieved. Similarly, a firm’s incentive to forego current
profits and invest in technologically superior machinery depends on the differential
between the returns to traditional and modern machinery (the returns to skill-biased
capital) and on the probability of finding adequately skilled labor that efficiently uti-
lizes modern technology. If parents expect a high return to education as a result of
sufficient skill-intensive job opportunities in the future, then they are more likely to
educate their children. Similarly, if firms expect a high return to skill-biased capital
as a result of a large supply of educated labor in the future, then they are more likely
to invest in modern technology.
The existence of capital-skill complementarities, together with ex-ante investments
in human and physical capital and costly bilateral search in the labor market, will
result in pecuniary social increasing returns to human and physical capital. The
intuition is straightforward. If the cost of education falls for a group of children, their
parents will invest more in their education. The firms that expect to employ these
children in the future (when they are grown workers) will want to invest more in
5
skill-biased capital. However, in a non-Walrasian labor market, it is not known which
firms will employ these workers. Many firms that hope to employ the more skilled
workers will invest more in skill-biased capital. The group of children for whom the
cost of education did not fall will compete for the same jobs in the future and expect
to be employed by some of these firms. As a result, many parents of those children for
whom the cost of education did not fall will invest more in their children’s education,
hoping that their children will be employed by the more skill-biased firms.
The effects that the cost and quality of education have on human capital invest-
ment decisions have received little attention in the literature on child labor. The cost
of education includes the monetary cost (tuition, fees, textbooks and stationery, uni-
forms, and travel costs) and the opportunity cost (foregone wages from child labor)
of education. An important observable measure of the cost of education is access to
schools. The scarcity of schools in some regions makes education inaccessible and
the cost of education almost prohibitive to the masses. Despite the availability of
schools in several remote areas, poor infrastructure and transport facilities discour-
age parents from educating their children. The poor quality of education in several
developing countries contributes to parents’ beliefs that education is worthless and
a waste of time. In an environment where children’s time has an economic value,
inaccessibility to schools and inadequate quality of schooling play an important role
in parents’ decisions to send their children to school or not.
Our theoretical model contributes to the literature on child labor in two ways.
When there is a unique equilibrium, there is an unambiguous improvement in the
welfare of all agents (households and firms) in response to government policies that
improve the quality of education or lower the cost of education or skill-biased capi-
6
tal.4 Moreover, this welfare improvement can be achieved by government policies that
target only a proportion of workers or firms. In the case of multiple equilibria, a ban
on child labor or compulsory schooling laws results in the same welfare improvement
of all agents. An unambiguous welfare improvement for all agents in response to
government policy or regulation that decreases child labor is missing in the existing
literature on child labor.5 In the second essay we empirically test if and how parent’s
human capital investments in their children respond to rates of return to education.
Using individual-level household data from the National Sample Survey Organization
(NSSO) and after correcting for selection bias using the method developed by Bour-
guignon et al. (2001), we first estimate the rates of return to primary, middle, high
school, and college education for males and females in each Indian state for four years
- 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999. Using present rates of return to education to capture
expected future rates of return to education, we then estimate the impact of the rates
of return to primary and middle school on participation in child labor and schooling
4The cost to the government of improving the quality of education or lowering the cost of educa-
tion or skill-biased capital could be substantial. Our model excludes the government and assumes
these three policy instruments are exogenous. Incorporating the government and endogenizing these
instruments in our model could result in a lower welfare of the government.
5In Basu & Van (1998) a total ban on child labor has an ambiguous effect on workers’ welfare
while a partial ban on child labor unambiguously lowers workers’ welfare. In both cases the impact
on firms’ welfare is not explored. Basu (2002) obtains a similar result. A ban on child labor has
an ambiguous effect on workers’ welfare while the impact on firms’ welfare is not analyzed. Ranjan
(1999) shows that a ban on child labor is welfare reducing for poor households because it constrains
the choices faced by them. Dessy (2000) shows that compulsory education is welfare improving
for workers. Dessy & Pallage (2001) show that eliminating child labor via a child labor ban or
compulsory education in combination with investment subsidies to firms can be welfare improving
for workers and firms.
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for boys and girls. The results indicate that participation in child labor falls for both
boys and girls in response to higher rates of return to education. However, schooling
only amongst boys increases in response to higher rates of return to education. Our
results are robust to several specifications.
In the third and final essay we explore changes in relative wages and the returns to
education in India over four years - 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999 - and the determinants
of these changes. In exploring the extent to which changes in relative demand and
supply can explain changes in relative wages, we focus on whether or not India’s trade
and investment liberalization reforms, implemented during the 1980s and 1990s, have
played a role via capital- and technology-skill complementarities. We first measure
the overall change in relative wages and then determine to what extent these changes
are explained by changes in wages by level of education, age, and gender. Next, we
examine in more detail the relationship between education and wages by estimating
the returns to education, using the selection bias correction method developed by
Bourguignon et al. (2001). We then conduct a simple demand and supply analysis
using the non-parametric method proposed by Katz & Murphy (1992) to examine
alternative explanations for changes in relative wages in India. We find that relative
demand changes contributed significantly to changes in relative wages during the pe-
riod which coincides with India’s liberalization of trade and investment. This suggests
that a higher demand for skilled labor, brought about by the transfer of skill-biased
capital and technology from developed and technologically more advanced countries
to India, might be responsible for higher relative wages of skilled labor in India. In-
ternational trade in manufactures predicts increases in the relative demand for both
high-skilled men and women. Further research into foreign direct investment and
outsourcing activities in India might shed some light on these critical determinants
8




Three pieces of literature provide a background to our research. First, the literature
on child labor and education examines the major determinants of child labor, the
equilibria existing in a market with child labor, and determinants of education in
developing countries. Second, the literature on investment in human and physical
capital provides evidence for the existence of complementarities between the two.
Third, there is a large body of literature that focuses on the impact of capital- and
technology-skill complementarities brought about by trade and investment liberaliza-
tion on the relative demand for, relative returns to, and productivities of skilled and
unskilled labor in both developed and developing countries.
2.1 Literature on Child Labor & Education
2.1.1 Theoretical Literature
The bulk of the theoretical literature on child labor focuses on poverty and credit
constraints as the main causes of child labor (Basu & Van 1998, Basu 2002, Ranjan
1999). Another strand of the literature examines the impact of trade on child labor
(Jafarey & Lahiri 2002, Edmonds & Pavcnik 2004, Cigno et al. 2002). Yet another
strand investigates the impact of technological changes on child schooling and child
10
labor (Foster & Rosenzweig 1996, Dessy & Pallage 2001). The two studies most
relevant to our theoretical analysis are Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) and Dessy &
Pallage (2001).
Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) develop a general equilibrium model with endogenous
school construction and investigate the impact of technological change and school
availability on schooling investments in landed and landless households. The Green
Revolution in India is used as an exogenous technological change to test their theoreti-
cal predictions empirically. Using land prices to capture expected future technologies,
the authors find that higher expected future technology and increases in the number
of schools raise schooling in landed households. However, even though increases in
the number of schools raise schooling in landless households, higher expected future
technology decreases schooling in landless households.
Our work differs from Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) in several ways. First, while
Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) differentiate between workers on the basis of asset own-
ership, heterogeneity amongst workers in our model arises because they face different
monetary costs of education and receive a different quality of education. Second,
in Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) there are two types of agents - landed and landless
workers. We incorporate heterogeneity amongst both workers (based on the cost
and/or quality of education they receive) and firms (based on their cost of investing
in skill-biased capital). Third, in Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) all workers know with
certainty what types of jobs they will have in the future. Landed households know
their children will perform skill-intensive tasks in the future (make decisions about
the adoption and management of new seeds) while landless households know their
children will perform manual tasks in the future (weeding or harvesting crops). In
our theoretical analysis, workers are uncertain about the type of job they will have
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in the future and firms are uncertain about the type of workers they will employ
in the future. Fourth, in Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) the returns to education for
only children from landed households are increasing in the level of technology while
children from landless households benefit only indirectly from technological change
because the number of schools increase. Here, the returns to all workers and firms
are increasing in investment in education and skill-biased technology.
Dessy & Pallage (2001) show how a coordination failure between parents’ invest-
ment in human capital and firms’ investment in skill-biased technology can result in
multiple equilibria - a no-education/no-investment equilibrium and a Pareto superior
one with both types of investment - in a model where parents and firms have discrete
investment choices. The authors show that the Pareto superior outcome is more likely
the more patient parents and firms are (agents have a high time discount factor) and
the higher is each firm’s return to investing in the skill-biased technology. In the
discrete version of our theoretical model, we show the existence of multiple equilibria.
In addition, we find that the Pareto superior outcome is more likely the higher each
firm’s return to investing in skill-biased technology is and the higher each parent’s
return to investing in his child’s education is.
2.1.2 Empirical Literature
The relationship between the returns to education and human capital investments is
an important one that has been insufficiently explored in the existing literature on
child labor and schooling. Several empirical studies provide evidence that child labor
and schooling are affected by more general local economic conditions such as openness,
globalization, technological innovations, economic growth, and labor markets.
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Edmonds & Pavcnik (2004) show that trade liberalization in Vietnam between
1993 and 1998 led to a large increase in the price of rice, Vietnam’s principle export
and major staple, which was a permanent shock. A higher price of rice resulted in
higher unskilled wages that brought about higher income and lower poverty among
unskilled households. This caused lower levels of child labor and higher levels of
schooling in rural Vietnam. Therefore, the income effect appears to have dominated
the substitution effect of a rise in unskilled wages in Vietnam.1 Cigno et al. (2002)
find that countries with greater openness have lower levels of child labor.
Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) examine the impact of agricultural technical changes
on schooling in rural India during the peak period of agricultural innovations associ-
ated with the Green Revolution (1968–1982). Using land prices to capture expected
future technologies, the authors find that higher expected future technology and in-
creases in the number of schools raise schooling levels in landed households. How-
ever, although increased school availability increases schooling in landless households,
higher expected future technology decreases schooling levels in landless households.
Empirical studies using Latin American data suggest that child labor is pro-
cyclical. Barros et al. (1994) find that child labor in Brazil was higher during
periods of economic growth than during economic downturns (temporary shocks).
Da Silva Leme & Wajnman (2000) find that schooling in Brazil was higher when
national unemployment was high, suggesting that children are more likely to attend
1When unskilled wages increase, unskilled households are richer. Unskilled parents have less need
for their children to work and supplement household income so child labor falls. Education becomes
more affordable for unskilled parents so child schooling rises. This is the income effect of an increase
in unskilled wages. However, when unskilled wages increase, the opportunity cost of schooling -
foregone wages from child labor - increases. Therefore, child labor rises and child schooling falls.
This is the substitution effect of an increase in unskilled wages.
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school if they cannot find employment. Neri & Thomas (2001) find that child labor
in Brazil was above a fitted trend line during periods of economic growth and on the
trend line during recessions. Swaminathan (1998) gets similar results for the western
Indian state of Gujarat. The author finds that massive economic growth in Gujarat
led to a sharp increase in the number of child workers, indicating that economic growth
alone is insufficient to eradicate child labor. This result has a direct implication for
the analysis in this paper. Economic growth will generate unskilled-labor-intensive
jobs and increase the demand for working children, unless it is accompanied by ed-
ucation policies and government incentive schemes that encourage firms to invest
in skilled-labor-intensive production technology. In other words, sustained growth
rather than cyclical expansion is required to improve human capital investments.
Labor market conditions are also shown to affect child labor and schooling. Duryea
& Arends-Kuening (2002) find that child labor increases and schooling decreases as
the local low skilled wage increases in Brazil. Krueger (2002) shows that child labor
increases and schooling decreases when the value of county-level coffee production in-
creases in Brazil. Unlike the study by Edmonds & Pavcnik (2004) where a permanent
increase in unskilled wages resulted in the income effect dominating the substitution
effect, these studies find that with temporary or cyclical increases in unskilled wages
the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
2.2 Literature on Human and Physical Capital Investment
One strand of the literature on human and physical capital investment shows that
human capital is attracted to human capital abundant regions. Lucas (1988) shows
theoretically that the rate of return on human capital is increasing in the stock of hu-
man capital in the workforce. Borjas et al. (1992) show empirically that high skilled
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workers migrate to regions where such skills are abundant. Bhagwati & Rodriguez
(1975) refer to this phenomenon as a ‘brain-drain’ and show how it hinders the de-
velopment of many countries. This phenomenon is driven by the idea that in many
developing countries, the low stock of human capital, results in low rates of return
to both human and physical capital, which further discourage investment in human
capital, thus creating a vicious cycle and underdevelopment trap.
Another strand of this literature shows that physical capital (or skill-biased tech-
nology) wants to go, as human capital does, to human capital abundant regions. In
Lucas (1990), a low stock of human capital restricts capital inflow and the growth
of poor countries. International variations in investments and growth rates are also
explained by variations in human capital across countries (Barro 1991, Benhabib &
Spiegel 1994). The geographical concentration of certain manufacturing industries -
for example, the software industries in Silicon Valley, California or Bangalore, India
- lends support to the idea that physical capital follows not only human capital but
also physical capital itself (Ellison & Glaeser 1994).
Our theoretical model follows Acemoglu (1996) closely. With a one-to-one random
matching process between entrepreneurs and adult workers, an exogenous matching
function, and exogenous sharing rule, Acemoglu (1996) shows that the returns to hu-
man and physical capital are increasing in the average human capital of the workforce
and average physical capital of firms. Unlike Acemoglu (1996), our model includes
the quality of education as a major determinant of both human and physical capital
investments. Therefore, in addition to examining the impact of the cost of education
and the cost of skill-biased technology on human and physical capital investments,
this model allows for an understanding of human and physical capital investments in
response to changes in the quality of education as well as the cost of education and
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the cost of investing in skill-biased capital.
2.3 Literature on Capital- and Technology-Skill Complementarities
This body of literature focuses on the impact of capital- and technology-skill com-
plementarities brought about by trade and investment liberalization on the relative
demand for, relative returns to, and productivities of skilled and unskilled labor in
both developed and developing countries.2
The theoretical literature in this area establishes the effect of trade and investment
liberalization on skilled and unskilled wages in developing countries and shows how
widening wage differentials are brought about as a result of skill-biased technology
transfer from developed to developing countries (Stokey 1991, Young 1991, Pissarides
1997, Feenstra & Hanson 2001).
There is a vast and rapidly growing empirical literature on the trade-technology-
skill and foreign investment-technology-skill links that focuses on the impact of trade
and investment liberalization on the demand for, returns to, and productivities of
skilled and unskilled labor (Robbins 1996, Coe et al. 1997, Robbins & Gindling 1999,
Beyer et al. 1999, Mayer 2001, Gorg & Strobl 2002, Hanson 2003).
Coe et al. (1997) find evidence for a large sample of developing countries, that
openness to capital goods imports from technologically advanced countries contribute
to an economy’s total factor productivity. For Costa Rica, Robbins & Gindling (1999)
find evidence that trade liberalization led to an increase in the relative demand for
skilled labor. Beyer et al. (1999) find rising wage inequality between skilled and
2See O’Connor & Lunati (1999) for a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on how
trade and investment liberalization may affect the demand for and returns to skill in developing
countries.
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unskilled workers after trade liberalization in Chile. Robbins (1996) finds similar
evidence for Argentina, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Uruguay, where trade liberalization brought about rising wage inequality. Mayer
(2001) finds that low-income countries as a group have substantially increased the
GDP-ratio of technology imports over recent years. However, improved access to
technology imports has raised labor productivity and the demand for skilled labor
in only some low-income countries, namely India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zim-
babwe. Gorg & Strobl (2002) find an increase in the relative wages of skilled labor in
Ghana, brought about by skill-biased technological change induced through imports
of technology-intensive capital goods or export activity. For Mexico, Hanson (2003)
finds an increase in the returns to skill and in regional wage dispersion during the




Complementarities Between Human and Physical Capital: A
Theoretical Model
We develop a theoretical model of capital-skill complementarities, where we show
that three factors affect parents’ investment in their children’s education and firms’
investment in skill-biased capital, via the returns to education and skill-biased capital.
These factors are the cost of investing in capital for firms, the cost of education, and
the quality of education available to children.
The layout of this essay is as follows. Section 3.1 sets up the theoretical model.
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 examine the Walrasian allocation and decentralized case with
search and random matching, respectively. Section 3.4 shows the existence of multiple
equilibria in the discrete version of the model and section 3.5 presents concluding
remarks.
3.1 Theoretical Model
Consider a two period economy (t = 0 and t = 1). In the first period agents invest in
human and physical capital and in the second period a single good is produced using
two factors of production - human capital and physical capital. There are three types
of individuals - parents, children, and entrepreneurs. We describe the model below.
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3.1.1 Consumers
On the consumption side at t = 0, there is a uniform distribution of parents whose
mass is normalized to 1. Each parent, p, has one child and a household consists of
one parent and one child. At t = 0, each parent chooses the proportion of time, ep,
his child spends in school. At t = 1, the grown child spends all his time working. The
total time available to a child at t = 0 and to a grown child at t = 1 is normalized to
1.
At t = 0, each parent chooses the proportion of time his child spends in school,
ep ∈ [e, 1], where e > 0. In school, each child receives a given quality of education,
hp. A grown child’s human capital level at t = 1 depends on both the quantity and
quality of education he received at t = 0. At t = 1 each grown child has human
capital level Hp = ephp. We assume that at t = 0 Hp = Ho > 0 to capture the idea
that every individual is born with a minimum level of knowledge. Therefore, a grown
child’s human capital level at t = 1 must be positive even if he spent no time in school
at t = 0, i.e. Hp = Ho + ephp > 0.
1
The total cost of educating child p at t = 0 is Cp = cp
e1+Γp
1+Γ
, where Γ > 0.2 Cp cap-
tures the monetary cost of education (tuition, fees, textbooks, stationery, uniforms,
and travel costs). However, Cp can also be interpreted as including the opportunity
cost of education, i.e. the foregone wages from child labor, if there is an informal sec-
tor (not modeled here) where children can work. The less time a child spends working
at t = 0, the more time he spends attending school, ep. As ep increases so does the
1The assumption that Ho > 0 ensures that output and therefore returns to workers and firms are
positive even when a parent chooses no education for his child.
2This functional form is used to make the total cost of education convex. The cost of education
can be linear or convex. An argument can be made for either case. A convex cost of education gives
a unique equilibrium while a linear cost of education gives multiple equilibria.
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total cost of education, Cp, both as a result of a higher monetary cost of education
(due to more time spent at school) and a higher opportunity cost of education (due
to less time spent at work and therefore more foregone wages from child labor).3
At t = 0 parent p chooses e to maximize the household’s expected utility over
both periods, E (Up), which is linear in the household’s second period income (Wp).
4:




where δ, the time discount factor common to all workers and firms, is assumed to be
1 for simplicity.
3.1.2 Producers
In the formal market at t = 0, there is a uniform distribution of firms whose mass
is normalized to 1. A single good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production




f = A (ephp)
α k1−αf , 0 < α < 1, is the
total output of firm f that employs worker p.
At t = 0 each firm invests in physical capital, kf , the returns of which are only
realized at t = 1, when parents are retired and children are working adults. We
assume that the level of physical capital that firm f chooses, kf , is directly related
to the type of production technology, with the minimum level of physical capital,
k0, representing unskill-biased production technology and higher levels representing a
3Including both the monetary and opportunity costs of education in the total cost, Cp, is a
simplifying assumption and does not change the main conclusions.
4Because the grown child provides for the parent at t = 1, a parent is not driven purely by
altruism when choosing how much to educate his child, but also by monetary gains for him and
his child. This assumption is justified by the practice in many developing economies where grown
children, especially sons, are expected to take care of their parents financially
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more skill-biased production technology.5 At t = 0 the cost of investing in skill-biased
capital for firm f is µf .
At t = 0 entrepreneur f chooses k to maximize the firm’s expected payoff over
both periods, E (Vf ), which is linear in the firms’ second period income (Rf ):
E (Vf ) = δE (Rf )− µfkf = E (Rf )− µfkf (3.2a)
3.2 First Best Case: The Walrasian Allocation
We begin with the Walrasian allocation. All agents make their investments at t = 0
and production occurs at t = 1 in one-worker-one-firm partnerships.6 In the fric-
tionless Walrasian system, at t = 0 the auctioneer calls out schedules of returns to
workers and firms, and trade stops when all markets clear. With Walrasian markets,
a worker is allocated to a firm where his marginal product is highest, and since human
and physical capital are complements, the most skilled worker will be matched with
the most skill-biased firm. If all workers and firms are ranked from most skilled or
skill-biased to least, then worker p and firm f will be matched together when they
have the same ranks in their respective orders.
This allocation is a Walrasian equilibrium if an only if all agents are paid their
marginal products in their pairings. The wage and rental rates for all equilibrium
5The investment decisions of firms are assumed to be irreversible. These decisions can be thought
of as the type of jobs they choose to create or the quality of machinery and equipment they choose
to purchase.
6The assumption that production occurs in a worker-firm pair is a simplifying one and does not
change the main conclusions. Also, because the mass of workers and firms are both normalized to
1, there is no unemployment.
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worker-firm pairs (Hp, kf ) are:







rf = r(Hp, kf ) = (1− α)A (ephp)α k−αf
The total equilibrium income of worker p and firm f are Wp = w(Hp, kf )Hp and
Rf = r(Hp, kf )kf .








(1− α)A (ephp)α k−αf = µf (3.3b)
Equation 3.3a, the first order condition for type p worker, implies a choice of
ep such that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of education is equal to the
marginal cost of an additional unit of education. Equation 3.3b, the first order con-
dition for type f firm, implies a choice of kf such that the marginal benefit of an
additional unit of skill-biased capital is equal to the marginal cost of an additional
unit of skill-biased capital. Equations 3.3a and 3.3b give eFBp and k
FB
















Where θ = α
Γ+1−α .
Proposition 1. 7 In the first best case (the Walrasian allocation),
7Detailed proofs of all propositions are in Appendix A.
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1. There exists a unique socially optimal outcome given by eFBp and k
FB
f for worker
p and firm f .
2. The socially optimal investments, returns, and welfare of worker p and firm f
are increasing in worker p’s quality of education and decreasing in worker p’s
cost of education and in firm f ’s cost of skill-biased capital.
3. The socially optimal investments, returns, and welfare of worker p and firm f
are independent of the distribution of workers and firms.
Proposition 1 is the result of efficient matching. At t = 0, worker-firm pairs are
known to all agents. As a result, the investment of each agent depends on only
those parameters that directly affect his own investment and the investment of the
agent he is matched with. The returns and welfare of each agent are increasing in
only his investment and the investment of the agent he is matched with. A worker
is indifferent about the human capital choices of other workers. Similarly, a firm is
indifferent about the physical capital choices of other firms.
3.3 The Decentralized Case with Search and Random Matching
We now turn to a model with costly bilateral search in the labor market where
switching partners has a cost of ε > 0. As before, all agents make their investments
at t = 0 and production occurs at t = 1 in one-worker-one-firm partnerships with
no unemployment. We assume that workers and firms are allocated to each other
with a random matching technology. Therefore, at t = 1 each worker has an equal
probability of meeting each firm, irrespective of the worker’s human capital and the
firm’s physical capital.
Two important features are introduced in this model as a result of replacing the
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Walrasian auctioneer with costly bilateral search in the labor market. First, wage
and rental rates are no longer equal to agents’ marginal products. Instead, as in the
standard search models, returns to workers and firms are determined by bargaining.
Here, we make the simplifying assumption that workers earn a share β and firms earn
the remaining share 1−β of total output.8 The total equilibrium income for worker p
and firm f is Wp = βypf and Rf = (1− β)ypf . The second feature that is introduced
is anonymity. Workers and firms do not know who their employers or employees will
be when they make their investments in human and physical capital. Therefore, there
is an incompleteness of contracts because agents cannot write contracts to improve
their investment incentives.
3.3.1 Homogenous Agents
We begin with the case of homogeneous agents. All children face the same cost of
education (cp = c ∀p) and receive the same quality of education (hp = h ∀p), and all
firms face the same cost of skill-biased capital (µf = µ ∀f). The expected returns for
workers and firms are:










As a result of random matching, each worker’s expected return depends on the
whole distribution of physical capital across firms,{kf}. Since each worker has an
equal probability of being matched with each firm, his expected output is A (ephp)
α (∫ k1−αf df)
8See Acemoglu (1996) for a derivation of this sharing rule. To understand why agents are paid a
share of total output rather than their marginal product, suppose that once a pair is formed both
parties must incur a cost ε to change partners. Even with very small search frictions, there may be
a large wedge between the marginal product of factors of production and their rates of return.
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and his expected return is a share β of this. Similarly, each firm’s expected return
depends on the whole distribution of human capital across workers,{Hp}. Since each






k1−αf and its expected return is a share (1− β) of this.
Since all workers are identical and all firms are identical, all workers will choose
the same level of education and all firms will choose the same level of physical capital.
The first order conditions for all workers and firms are:
αβAeα−1hαk1−α = ceΓ (3.5a)
(1− α)(1− β)A (eh)α k−α = µ (3.5b)
The optimal investment levels, e∗ and k∗, for each worker and firm are:
e∗ =
(










Where θ = α
Γ+1−α .
Proposition 2. In the decentralized case with random matching, with Wp = βypf
and Rf = (1− β)ypf , and with homogeneous agents,
1. There exists a unique equilibrium given by e∗ and k∗ for each worker and firm.
2. The optimal investment levels of workers and firms are inefficient, i.e. e∗ < eFB
and k∗ < kFB.
3. The investments, returns, and welfare of all workers and firms are increasing in
the quality of education for all workers and decreasing in the cost of education
for all workers and in the cost of skill-biased capital for all firms.
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Proposition 2 (2) - under-investment in human and physical capital - is the result
of incompleteness of contracts. The terms β and (1−β) make e∗ and k∗ inefficient, and
these are the terms introduced by the incompleteness of contracts. There is no sharing
rule that can restore efficiency in this economy.9 Proposition 2 (3) shows that there are
social increasing returns to investment in human and physical capital in this economy.
A lower cost or higher quality of education for children not only increases investments,
returns, and welfare of workers, but also increases the investments, returns, and
welfare of firms.10 Proposition 2 (3) also captures complementarities between human
and physical capital. Human and physical capital want to go to regions where these
factors are already abundant. This explains the geographical concentration of skill-
intensive industries, the lack of capital flow to low-skill areas, and higher rates of
return to human capital in high average education urban areas.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous Agents
We now turn to the case of heterogeneous agents and show an even stronger form of
social increasing returns. We assume that there are two types of children (i = 1, 2)
two types of firms (j = 1, 2). Type 1 children receive quality of education h1 and
face cost of education c1 whereas type 2 children receive quality of education h2 and
9No value of β can restore efficiency. This is because, as β approaches 1, correct investment incen-
tives are restored for parents but firms’ investment incentives are increasingly distorted. Conversely,
as β approaches 0, correct investment incentives are restored for firms but parents’ investment
incentives are increasingly distorted.
10This result is driven by the investment response of the other side of the market to a change in
a parameter. A change in an exogenous variable must occur before the other side of the market
invests and must be known to the other side of the market. For example, if a change in the cost of
education for children occurs after firms have made their investment decisions or if it is unknown to
firms, then there will be no change in firms’ investments.
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face cost of education c2. There is a mass of λ of type 1 children and (1− λ) of type
2 children at t = 0. Type 1 firms face cost of skill-biased capital µ1 whereas type
2 firms face cost of skill-biased capital µ2. There is a mass of ρ of type 1 firms and
(1− ρ) of type 2 firms at t = 0.
The expected returns for type i worker and type j firm are:
E (Wi) = W (Hi, {kj}) = βA (eihi)α
(
ρk1−α1 + (1− ρ)k1−α2
)
E (Rj) = R({Hi}, kj) = (1− β)Ak1−αj (λ (e1h1)
α + (1− λ) (e2h2)α)










(1− α)(1− β)Ak−αj (λ (e1h1)
α + (1− λ) (e2h2)α) = µj (3.7b)
The optimal investments for all workers and firms are:
e∗1 =
(
αβ ((1− α)(1− β))(1−α)/α A1/α
)1/Γ (
ρ (µ1)










αβ ((1− α)(1− β))(1−α)/α A1/α
)1/Γ (
ρ (µ1)












αβ ((1− α)(1− β))1/θ A(Γ+1)/α
)1/Γ (
ρ (µ1)


















−θ + (1− λ) (h2)θ(Γ+1) (c2)−θ
)1/θΓ (3.8d)
Where θ = α
Γ+1−α .
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Proposition 3. In the decentralized case with random matching, with Wp = βypf
and Rf = (1− β)ypf , and with homogeneous agents,
1. There exists a unique equilibrium given by e∗i and k
∗
j for type i worker and type
j firm, where i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2.
2. The investments, returns, and welfare of type i worker and type j firm are
increasing in the quality of education for all workers and decreasing in the cost
of education for all workers and in the cost of skill-biased capital for all firms.
3. The investments, returns, and welfare of type i worker and type j firm, are
increasing in the proportion of high-skilled workers and skill-biased firms.
Proposition 3 establishes a stronger form of social increasing returns to human
and physical capital investment. If agents are heterogeneous in terms of the cost or
quality of education or the cost of skill-biased capital that they face, then a change
in a parameter for just a proportion of agents will affect the investments, returns,
and welfare of all agents in the economy. The intuition is based on the idea that
at t = 0, before each agent makes his investment decision, parents and firms are
unaware of worker-firm matchings at t = 1. If type 1 children experience either a
lower cost or higher quality of education, these children’s parents will invest more
in their education. Firms expect there to be more human capital in the workforce
and therefore expect a higher return to investment in skill-biased capital. So, firms
invest more in skill-biased capital to take advantage of this. Parents of type 2 children
expect a higher return to their children’s education as a result of more skill-biased
capital in the economy and therefore invest more in their children’s education.11
11Similarly, if type 1 firm experiences a lower cost of investing in skill-biased capital, these firms
will invest more in skill-biased capital. Workers expect there to be more skill-biased capital in the
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In terms of policy to diminish or eradicate child labor, Propositions 2 and 3 provide
two striking results. First, this model shows that subsidizing education or improving
the quality of education for only a proportion of households is sufficient to increase
education and lower child labor in unsubsidized households as well. So a minimal cost
policy to eradicate child labor potentially exists, whereby some mechanism allows one
to differentiate between various types of workers and target the group that is least
costly to subsidize or improve the quality of education for. For example, a group can
be cheaper to target if it is smaller than other groups. However, a lower cost policy
might be less effective since the other side of the market responds less to a change
in a parameter that benefits a smaller group.12 Second, targeted education policies
and skill-biased investment subsidies are shown to be substitutable instruments for
increasing education and decreasing child labor in an economy.
Note. The decentralized case with efficient matching is in between the Walrasian al-
location and the decentralized case with search and random matching. In the case of
homogeneous agents, the allocation described in Proposition 2 is the unique equilib-
rium. In the case of heterogeneous agents, if type 1 children experience a lower cost
economy and therefore expect a higher return to education. So workers invest more in education to
take advantage of this. Type 2 firms expect a higher return to skill-biased capital as a result of more
human capital in the workforce and therefore invest more in skill-biased capital. Acemoglu (1996)
obtains similar results with respect to the costs of human and physical capital. However, unlike
Acemoglu (1996), the results presented here show that human and physical capital investments are
also increasing in the quality of education for all or a proportion of children.
12For example, if the proportion of low human capital workers, λ, is small and the government
subsidizes education for this group, these workers will increase their investments in human capital.
However, because λ is small, the probability of meeting each of these workers is low, so firms will
increase their skill-biased investments less than if λ was high. So the aggregate effect of a minimal
cost policy based on the size of a group of agents may be small.
29
or higher quality of education, then the investments, returns, and welfare of these
grown children and the firms they are matched with will improve. Type 2 children
and firms will be unaffected.
The decentralized case with efficient matching is not analyzed here because in real-
ity the matching technology is more random than efficient since an efficient matching
technology requires an invisible hand creating the right matches. Although certain
labor market institutions, like job advertising and interviewing, play this role, there
is still a high degree of randomness. The real world matching technology can there-
fore be thought of as a combination of random and efficient matching. As a result,
social increasing returns will be present in general, though their significance might be
limited if the matching technology is closer to an efficient one.
3.4 Multiple Equilibria
The idea that human and physical capital are attracted to regions where these factors
are already abundant gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria - one equilib-
rium with low investments in education and skill-biased capital and the other with
high investments in both.
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, with a convex cost of education, the continuous version of
the model generates a unique equilibrium. However, with a linear cost of education,
the continuous model generates multiple equilibria. Because it is difficult to find closed
form solutions for the multiple equilibria generated in the continuous model with a
linear cost of education, we use the discrete model with a linear cost of education to
illustrate the existence of Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria.
In the discrete model, we assume for simplicity that there is one parent and one
firm. At t = 0 the parent chooses to either send his child to school full time (e = 1)
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at cost c or to work full time (e = e) where he will earn γW0, 0 < γ < 1, where γ is
a parameter that measures the productivity of a child worker and W0 is the income
of an adult worker at t = 0.13 If a parent decides to educate his child, the total cost
of education is the sum of the monetary cost of education, c, and the opportunity
cost of education, γW0. While the continuous version of the model includes both
the monetary and opportunity cost of education in the total cost of education, Ci
(Section 3.1.1), these two costs of education are separable in the discrete version. At
t = 1 the firm chooses between two levels of capital or two types of technologies, k0
and k1, where k1 > k0. The cost of retaining the traditional or unskill-biased capital
is µk0 while the cost of investing in the modern or skill-biased capital is µk1.
If both agents invest, their payoff functions are:
U11 = U(e = 1, k = k1) = βAh
αk1−α1 − c (3.9a)
V11 = V (e = 1, k = k1) = (1− β)Ahαk1−α1 − µk1 (3.9b)
If the parent invests but the firm does not, their payoff functions are:
U10 = U(e = 1, k = k0) = βAh
αk1−α0 − c (3.10a)
V10 = V (e = 1, k = k0) = (1− β)Ahαk1−α0 − µk0 (3.10b)
If the firm invests but the parent does not, their payoff functions are:
U01 = U(e = e, k = k1) = γW0 + βA (eh)
α k1−α1 (3.11a)
V01 = V (e = e, k = k1) = (1− β)A (eh)α k1−α1 − µk1 (3.11b)
13The income of an adult worker and firm at t = 0 is excluded from the analysis in both the
continuous and discrete versions of the model because all workers and firms are assumed to be
identical in the first period. Therefore, the income of all workers and all firms are identical at t = 0,
and do not affect their investment decisions.
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If neither agent invests, their payoff functions are:
U00 = U(e = e, k = k0) = γW0 + βA (eh)
α k1−α0 (3.12a)
V00 = V (e = e, k = k0) = (1− β)A (eh)α k1−α0 − µk0 (3.12b)
Proposition 4. If βAk1−α1 (h











1. There exist two pure strategy Nash equilibria - one no-investment equilibrium
and the other a full-investment one.
2. The full-investment equilibrium Pareto-dominates the no-investment one.
Stated differently, Proposition 4 establishes the existence of two Pareto-ranked
equilibria if two conditions hold simultaneously. First, there is a net benefit to edu-
cation when the firm invests in skill-biased capital but a net loss to education when
the firm retains the unskill-biased capital. Second, there is a net benefit to investing
in skill-biased capital when the parent educates his child but a net loss to investing
in skill-biased capital when the parent sends his child to work.
Proposition 4, like Propositions 2 and 3, captures complementarities between hu-
man and physical capital. The existence of a no-investment and full-investment equi-
librium explains how some developing countries fall into an underdevelopment trap,
which is difficult to escape. Inadequate initial conditions - low levels of investments
in human and physical capital - can generate a vicious cycle of high levels of child
labor and insufficient employment opportunities for educated labor. Propositions 2
and 3 show that improvements in the quality of education and easier access to ed-
ucation and skill-biased capital can act as forces that pull an economy out of an
underdevelopment trap.
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An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the existence of Pareto-ranked mul-
tiple equilibria. If an economy is at the no-investment equilibrium, then a ban on
child labor or a compulsory schooling law that will move the economy away from the
no-investment equilibrium and toward the full-investment one, is Pareto-improving.
All agents - parents, children, and firms - are better off at the full-investment equi-
librium than at the no-investment one. As mentioned in the introduction, this result
is not obtained in the previous literature on child labor.14
3.5 Conclusion
The model presented here has shown that investments in human and physical capital
are increasing in the average quality of education and decreasing in the average cost
of education and average cost of firms’ investing in skill-biased capital. While the
majority of literature on child labor focuses on socio-economic household character-
istics (poverty, asset ownership, parents education, etc.) as its major determinants,
this paper shows that the institutional characteristics of an economy - education,
investment, and trade structures and policies - can potentially have a large impact
on child labor and child schooling in an economy.15 Since institutional variables are
more amenable to policy intervention than individuals’ socio-economic background,
the institutional determinants of child labor are worth examining.
Moreover, while the previous literature focuses on the enforcement of regulations,
such as compulsory schooling laws and partial or full child labor bans, as ways to
decrease or eradicate child labor, this paper explores policies that shift parents’ in-
14The exception is Dessy & Pallage (2001).
15The cost of education and skill-biased capital depend, to a large extent, on access to schools
and skill-biased capital, respectively. So policies that make schools and skill-biased capital more
accessible to children and firms respectively will increase human and physical capital investments.
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centives toward investing in their children’s education. Improving the quality of
education and access to schools, subsidizing skill-biased capital acquisition for firms,
promoting the use of high-technology agricultural techniques that require more edu-
cated laborers, and improving access to skill-biased capital and machinery via open-
ness of the economy, are policies that can significantly lower child labor levels and
increase education in developing countries.
The model presented here differs from most theoretical studies on child labor (the
exception is Dessy & Pallage (2001)) that find an ambiguous effect on workers’ and
firms’ welfare as a result of a partial or full ban on child labor. In the continuous
version of the model (Section 3.3), the welfare of all agents improves unambiguously in
response to policies that improve the quality of education, lower the cost of education,
or lower the cost of firms’ investment in skill-biased capital. In the discrete model
(Section 3.4), a ban on child labor or a compulsory schooling law that moves the
economy away from the no-investment to the full-investment equilibrium is Pareto-
improving.
Finally, with costly bilateral search and random matching in the labor market,
such that workers and firms don’t know with whom they will be paired, improving the
quality of education and lowering the cost of education and firms’ cost of investing in
skill-biased capital for even a small proportion of agents, results in greater investments
by, returns to, and welfare of all agents. This result suggests that a minimal cost policy
to lower child labor and increase schooling potentially exists for developing countries.
3.6 Extensions
One interesting extension to the existing model is to allow the discount factor, δ, to
be less than 1. Allowing δ < 1 addresses a parent’s incentive to educate his child. The
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lower the value of δ, the less weight a parent attaches to his child’s future income,
perhaps because it is less likely for the parent to claim his child’s income. Also,




Returns to Education, Child Labor, and Schooling in India
In this essay, we test the theoretical proposition established in the first essay that
human capital investments respond to changes in the returns to education, by esti-
mating the impact of the returns to education on participation in child labor and
schooling in India. Section 4.1 gives a brief background on child labor and educa-
tion in India. Section 4.2 describes the data while Section 4.3 outlines the empirical
analysis. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.1 Child Labor and Education in India
India serves as a good case study for our empirical analysis for several reasons. First,
rather than attempt to control for differences in cultures, legal systems, and other
institutions across countries, it is more effective to focus on a single country where
these factors can be held constant (see Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C for a
comparison of India with other countries). Second, India is a large country, providing
a large number of intra-national observations that are convenient for a statistical
analysis. Third, not only does India have the largest number of child workers in the
world, with credible estimates ranging from 60 to 115 million working children, there
is also a considerable amount of regional variation in child labor and education across
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the country (see Table C.3 in Appendix C).
Child labor, as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and by the
Indian Census, is defined as children in the age group 5–14 years who are ‘economically
active’. A person is economically active if he/she does work on a regular basis for
which he/she receives remuneration or if such labor results in output for the market.
The education system in India consists of primary (grades 1 through 5), middle
(grades 6 through 8), secondary (grades 9 through 10), and higher secondary (grades
11 through 12) education. Primary education is a shared responsibility of state and
central governments, though state governments are the main actors responsible for the
allocation of educational inputs at the local level. The majority of primary schools
are public schools funded by state governments. Private schools are either aided
or unaided. Aided private schools are privately managed but are financed, almost
exclusively, by state governments.
Even though several laws prohibit the use of child labor in certain activities and
compulsory education laws exist in several Indian states, legislation with respect to
child labor and education is rarely enforced. Opposition from employers of child labor-
ers and from parents of children who work creates political pressures that discourage
enactment of these laws. The Child Labor Prohibition & Regulation Act (August,
1986) prohibits the employment of children below the age of 14 in certain occupa-
tions and processes, while regulating work conditions in other jobs. Children are
prohibited from employment in bidi-making; carpet-weaving; cement manufacturing;
cloth printing, dyeing, and weaving; match manufacturing; explosives and fireworks;
mica cutting and splitting; shellac manufacturing; soap manufacturing; tanning; wool
cleaning; and building and construction work. It also prohibits the employment of
children on railway and port premises. The act provides for the protection of child
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laborers not employed in the above specified hazardous occupations and processes. It
sets limits on the number of hours children can work continuously, limits the number
of days of employment, and restricts the times of work. Central and state govern-
ments are permitted to set rules for cleanliness in the work place, the disposal of
wastes and effluents, ventilation, temperature, dust, and fumes. Moreover, employers
are required to maintain a register with the names and birth dates of all children they
employ. This law only covers factories with over 10 workers. Since most children work
in the informal sector and in unregistered factories with less than 10 workers, they are
not protected by it. Children working in factories with over 10 workers are usually
not recorded in the register. Moreover, employers who violate this law are required
to pay a small fine, after which they continue to employ children. With respect to
education, article 45 of the Indian Constitution declares that the state shall endeavor
to provide free and compulsory education for all children below the age of 14 years.1
Lack of enforcement of child labor and education legislation is generally attributed
to political pressures from employers of child laborers and parents who send their
children to work. In many rural areas, employers and parents are unaware that child
labor is an offense. Moreover, it is the norm or social custom amongst families (poor
and relatively better-off ones) to stop educating their children after a few years of
primary school and to send them to work.
There is a great deal of regional variation in child labor and schooling among
the country’s 31 states and union territories, with child labor as high as 55% in the
western state of Gujarat and as low as 7% in Himachal Pradesh and schooling highest
in Kerala at 94% and lowest in Bihar at 51% in 1999 (see Tables C.5, C.6, C.7, and
C.8 in Appendix C).2 Table C.9 in Appendix C reveals that child labor increased
1Table C.4 in Appendix C summarizes Indian legislation with respect to child labor and education.
2Child laborers consist of children who are engaged in full time or part time market work, house-
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sharply from 1983 to 1988 and then declined from 1988 to 1999, while schooling has
steadily increased from 1983 to 1999. From 1983 to 1988 children engaged in neither
work nor school decreased dramatically. In our data, 28.52% of children are reported
as too young to work or attend school in 1983 and are therefore included as children
engaged in neither work nor school.
4.2 Data Source
The individual level data used in this study comes from the Employment and Unem-
ployment Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), administered
nationally by the Government of India. The Employment and Unemployment Sched-
ules are administered every five years in four sub-rounds, each with a duration of
three months.3 An equal number of households are allotted for survey during each of
these four sub-rounds. We use the NSSO surveys for the years 1983, 1988, 1993, and
1999, which are the only years for which data is electronically available. The data set
consists of a time-series of cross-sections since different households are surveyed every
year. Households are selected via stratified random sampling.4 The NSSO survey
hold enterprise work, or domestic activities. Schooling consists of children who attend school full
time or part time.
3The four sub-rounds are from July to September, October to December, January to March, and
April to June.
4The survey covers the entire Indian Union except for certain inaccessible regions. Villages within
a district are selected on the basis of their accessibility. For example, in the 1999 survey, the entire
Ladakh and Kargil districts of Jammu and Kashmir, interior villages of Nagaland located beyond
5 kilometers of a bus route, and some inaccessible villages of Andaman and Nicobar Islands were
excluded. The number of sample households surveyed within a village or town is chosen on the
basis of its population. Households are first listed and then divided into two groups, affluent and
non-affluent households, based on monthly expenditure levels (urban) and ownership of certain items
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includes household and individual level data - household size and composition, so-
cial group, religion, income, assets, indebtedness, demographic variables (age, gender,
marital status), education participation and attainment, and a detailed employment
section on principle and subsidiary activities (industry, occupation, type and amount
of income earned, and intensity of each activity).
4.3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis examines the theoretical proposition that parents invest more
in their children’s education in response to higher returns to education. Specifically,
higher returns to primary and middle school are expected to lower participation in
child labor and increase participation in schooling.5
The returns to education can lower child labor and increase schooling through two
mechanisms. First, parents’ expectations of the future returns to investing in their
children’s education affect their present educational investment decisions for their
children. This is the mechanism that our theoretical model captures. However, the
returns to education can also affect participation in child labor and schooling via the
income effect. In other words, in states with higher returns to education, educated
parents are wealthier, making them less likely to send their children to work and
more likely to educate their children. The results of the empirical analysis capture
the impact of the returns to education on participation in child labor and schooling
(rural). A fixed number of households within each group are then randomly selected.
5Children aged 5 to 14 years are included in our analysis. Given that children in the age-group
5 to 14 years attend primary or middle school, only the returns to primary and middle school are
included as explanatory variables. However, if parents are forward looking, the returns to high school
and college could also affect parents’ investment in their children’s education. As a robustness check
we include the returns to high school and college as explanatory variables (see Section 4.5.2).
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via both these mechanisms. In our empirical analysis, though we cannot rule out the
income effect, we expect the first mechanism to be the primary channel through which
state-level returns to education affect participation in child labor and schooling for
the following reason. The returns to education are estimated at the state level. If the
income effect determines participation in child labor and schooling, it is more likely
to work through household-level income rather than state-level returns to education.
Household income and land ownership are included as controls in order to capture an
income effect.
4.3.1 Estimating the Returns to Education
Earnings regressions are estimated, after correcting for selection bias using the method
developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001), separately for males and females in each In-
dian state (25 states and 6 union territories) for four years (1983, 1988, 1993, and
1999). Using data for the adult population aged 15 years and above, earnings re-
gressions are estimated after correcting for selection bias since non-zero wages are
reported only for a sub-sample, i.e. those engaged in wage employment.6 If the se-
lection of this sub-sample of individuals is random, then the estimates of an ordinary
least squares earnings regression will be consistent and unbiased. If, however, the
selection of this sub-sample is systematic - i.e. the error terms in the selection regres-
sion and the earnings regression are correlated - then ignoring the non-random nature
of the sample will introduce a selection bias.7 Therefore the selection process is mod-
eled as having four possible outcomes: (1) non-participation in the labor market, (2)
6Appendix B includes a detailed discussion of the correction for selection bias in estimating the
returns to education.
7See Kingdon & Unni (1998) and Duraiswamy (2000) for similar studies on the Indian labor
market.
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unemployment, (3) self-employment, and (4) wage employment. A multinomial logit
model is used to estimate the selection process. The selection bias correction term
is calculated from the selection regression and included in the earnings regression
to correct for the selection bias, using the method developed by Bourguignon et al.
(2001).8
Consider the following equations for the earnings regression (Equation 4.1a) and
the selection process into wage employment (Equation 4.1b):9
ys = xsβs + µs (4.1a)
y∗s = zsγs + ηs (4.1b)
where ys is earnings (the outcome variable) and y
∗
s is employment status (the selection
variable) and s is a categorical variable representing an individual’s choice between
M alternatives, s = 1, ...,M . The variables xs and zs are exogenous, where xs is
a subset of zs in order to identify the earnings equation.
10 The error term in the
earnings regression, µs, has E (µs|x, z) = 0 and V (µs|x, z) = σ2.
8See Chapter 5, Section 5.4 for a discussion of our results on selection bias in our earnings
regressions.
9The i subscript for individuals is suppressed.
10The appropriate identifying variables as suggested by labor supply theory are an exogenous
source of non-labor income to capture household need and variables such as parent’s education to
capture family background. In the absence of data on non-labor income and parent’s education,
alternate identifying variables have been used in this analysis. Household need is captured by the
total area of land owned by the household, whether or not the individual is married, and the size of
the household. These three variables are expected to affect participation in wage employment but
not wages earned. Earnings regressions are estimated separately for males and females in each of
31 states and 4 years. This gives us a total of 248 earnings regressions (2 x 31 x 4). The variables
included in xs are four dummies to capture an individual’s highest level of education (primary,
middle, high school, or college, where the omitted category is no education), an individual’s age and
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To obtain consistent estimates of β4, since the observed outcome belongs to cate-
gory s = 4, Bourguignon et al. (2001) propose estimating the following model:
y4 = x4β4 + λ + ν4 (4.2)













and the error term ν4 is orthogonal to all other terms on the RHS and has zero
expectation.11
Earnings regressions are estimated using a standard semi-logarithmic specification
following Mincer (1970):
ln y4 = x4β4 + λ + ν4 (4.4)
The return to education level e for gender g in state j and year t is calculated as:
Returnegjt = βegjt − βe−1,gjt (4.5)
where βegjt is the coefficient for the dummy for education level e for gender g in state
j and year t in the earnings regression. The subscript e represents primary, middle,
high school, and college education (e = {p, m, h, c})12, gender g can be male or female,
age-square, dummies for an individual’s caste (low-caste/high-caste), religion (Muslim/non-Muslim),
and sector (urban/rural), three season dummies (the omitted season is from July to September) to
capture when the individual was surveyed, and the local unemployment rate. The variables included
in zs consist of all those in xs and the total area of land possessed, whether or not the individual is
married, and the household size.
11Refer to Equation B.15 in Appendix B for details.
12High school consists of secondary school (grades 9 and 10) and higher secondary school (grades
11 and 12).
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state j represents India’s 31 states, and t represents four years (1983, 1988, 1993, and
1999). The rate of return to education level e captures the additional log of hourly
wages earned by an individual with education level e compared to an individual with





where Y earse represents the number of years required to complete education level e
(five years for primary school, 3 years for middle school, four years for high school,
and 3 years for college).
4.3.2 Returns to Education, Child Labor, and Schooling
Participation in child labor and schooling is estimated using the rates of return to
primary and middle school as the key independent variables for boys and girls aged
5 to 14 years. The returns to education capture both inter-state and inter-temporal
variation. Household- and individual-level controls are included as well as year and
state dummies. Because aggregate variables (returns to education) are used to esti-
mate individual outcomes (participation in child labor and schooling), the standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the year-state level (Moulton (1990)).
Two points should be noted. First, we estimate the impact of present rather than
expected rates of return to education on child labor and schooling. We do this not
because we expect future returns to be identical to present returns to education, but
because in the absence of a measure of expected returns, present returns to education
represent some signal of returns to education in the future. Second, rates of return to
education not only in a child’s state of residence but also in other states could affect
his participation in child labor and schooling. Even though inter-state migration is
relatively low in India (due to language barriers), education provides individuals with
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greater mobility in labor markets. Yet, returns to education in one’s own state may
be the only signal individuals have of employment opportunities for educated workers.
In any case, an extension to our analysis could be to include the rates of returns to
education not only in one’s own state but also in neighboring states as explanatory
variables.
Because the dependent variables for participation in child labor and schooling are
both binary, the binary probit model is used. The probit model assumes that there
is a latent variable y∗ikjt that can be expressed as a linear function of variables that
affect the probability of participation in child labor (or schooling). This expression
can be written as:
y∗ikjt = βXikjt + εikjt (4.7)
where Xikjt is a set of explanatory variables for child i in household k, state j, and
year t, β is the vector of coefficients that are estimated, and εikjt is an error term.
The latent variable y∗ikjt is unobservable and instead a dummy variable is defined as
yikjt = 1 if a child participates in child labor (or schooling) and zero otherwise:
yikjt =

1 if y∗ikjt > 0
0 otherwise
(4.8)
The probit model assumes that the error term εikjt is distributed according to
the cumulative normal distribution function. Therefore, the probability of a child
participating in child labor (or schooling) Pikjt can be written as:












Dependent Variables - Child Labor And Schooling
In estimating the impact of the returns to education on participation in child labor
and schooling, the sample includes children aged 5 to 14 years to adhere to the ILO’s
definition of child labor. Children working in the market or household enterprise and
those engaged in domestic duties are defined as child laborers for the purpose of this
analysis.13 Children who attend an educational institution are defined as attending
school.
The dependent variable ChildLabor−ftptikjt reflects a child’s employment status
and equals 1 if he/she is reported as working full time or part time during the past
7 days and 0 otherwise.14 The dependent variable School − ftptikjt reflects a child’s
school enrollment status and equals 1 if the child attended school full time or part
time during the past 7 days and 0 otherwise. Table C.10 in Appendix C includes
a description of the dependent and independent variables and the expected signs of
their coefficients. Descriptive statistics for all variables are found in Table C.11 in
Appendix C.
13Regression results don’t vary significantly when children engaged in domestic work are excluded
from the definition of child labor (see Section 4.5.2). Children engaged in domestic duties are
considered child laborers because domestic duties constitute ‘work’ rather than ‘leisure’. Domestic
work includes mostly cooking, cleaning, and taking care of younger siblings.
14The index i represents the I children in the sample, k is an index for the K households, j is an
index for the J states, and t is an index for the year.
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Independent Variables
The key independent variables are the rates of return to primary and middle school.
Rateegjt represents the rate of return to education level e (e = {primary, middle}) for
gender g (male or female), state j, and year t. The rate of return to education level
e captures the additional log of hourly wages earned by an individual with education
level e compared to an individual with education level (e− 1), per year of education
level e. The control variables in the empirical estimations can be divided into three
categories - household demographic characteristics, household economic conditions,
and individual child-specific controls. Year dummies and state dummies are included
to capture time-variant and state-specific effects. Also, season dummies are included
to capture when the individual was surveyed.15
Household demographic characteristics include the number of children in the
household (Childrenkjt), four dummies each to capture the father’s education level
(F −Primary, F −Middle, F −High, and F −College) and the mother’s education
level (M−Primary, M−Middle, M−High, and M−College), and dummy variables
that capture whether the household is urban (Urbankjt), low-caste (Lowcastekjt), and
Muslim (Muslimkjt).
16 The number of children in the household is included to cap-
ture the idea that families with more children have fewer resources to educate each
15The omitted year is 1983, the omitted state is Delhi, the nation’s capital, and the omitted season
is Season1, from July to September. The other seasons are Season2 from October to December,
Season3 from January to March, and Season4 from April to June.
16Only households where a father and mother are both present are included. Therefore, the impact
of both the father’s and mother’s education on child labor and child schooling can be examined. An
alternative is to include all households and examine the impact of the education level and gender
of the household head on child labor and child schooling. The omitted category for the parent’s
education dummies is less than primary or no formal education.
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child, in other words the quantity-quality trade-off. The education levels of the father
and mother are included because parents with higher education have greater value
for education and are more likely to educate their children than uneducated parents.
Work and school decisions for children might be considerably different for those in
urban and rural regions. Agricultural activities in rural areas might make children
more likely to work on the household farm. The Low-caste and Muslim dummies
capture possible discrimination against these groups.
Since poverty and credit constraints have been shown to be the major causes of
child labor, we control for household economic conditions and include the log of house-
hold monthly per capita consumption expenditure (LogExpenditurekjt), adjusted to
1988 Rupees, a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the household owns land
(Assetkjt), and a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the child’s mother works
outside the household (WorkingMotherkjt).
17 Wealthier households are more likely
to send their children to school rather than work. Ownership of assets indicates that
a household is relatively wealthy and should decrease the likelihood of child labor and
increase the likelihood of schooling. However, household ownership of land, especially
in rural areas, could increase a child’s likelihood of working because children are more
likely to be engaged in agricultural activities (seasonal or full time) if their parents
own and cultivate land. When the mother works outside the household, a child is
17We face several problems with the expenditure variable. First, household monthly per capita
consumption expenditure (LogExpenditurekjt) is endogenous since it includes wages earned by
children in calculating household expenditure. Second, household expenditure is calculated using
an abbreviated list of items in 1999 compared to the three previous years. Therefore household
expenditure is lower in 1999 compared to 1983, 1988, and 1993. We exclude this variable as an
explanatory one as a robustness check (see Section 4.5.2) and find that our main results remain
robust.
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more likely to be engaged in domestic chores like cooking and taking care of younger
siblings, especially in the case of female children. On the other hand, if the mother
works, the household could be less dependent on earnings from child labor, making
child labor less likely and schooling more likely.
Individual child-specific controls include the child’s age (Ageikjt), the square of
his/her age (Agesqikjt), and a gender dummy (Maleikjt). In most empirical studies
on child labor it has been found that older children are more likely to work than
younger children and that this effect diminishes with a child’s age. Older children are
more likely to work because they tend to be more productive than younger children
and therefore earn higher wages than younger children. Moreover, older children are
sent to work to support younger siblings. In many developing countries, educating
sons are given priority over educating daughters. In India, traditional gender roles
still persist, even though these are becoming weaker. A boy’s education improves his
income-earning potential while a girl’s education is often considered worthwhile only
because it improves her marriage prospects.
Interactions of all the independent variables with the gender dummy are included
to incorporate different effects of each independent variable on participation in child
labor and schooling for boys and girls.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Overall Significance
Before discussing results of individual variables, some indication of the overall pre-
dictive performance of the model is useful. Table 4.1 reports results of the likelihood
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Table 4.1: Likelihood-Ratio Test
Dependent Variable LR Test Statistic
Work - full time or part time 602.24***
School - full time or part time 353.44***
***Significant at 1%.
ratio test for the restricted and unrestricted regressions.18 The likelihood ratio test
results indicate that the rates of return to primary and middle school are significant
determinants of participation in child labor and schooling for all groups of children.
Two measures of overall predictive performance are reported in Table 4.2. The
pseudo R-square is defined as 1 − (Log Likelihood/Restricted Log Likelihood) and
supports the results of the likelihood ratio test. The pseudo R-square increases slightly
when the rates of return to education are added as explanatory variables.
The second measure is ĪR from Betancourt & Clague (1981), which is a measure
of information that scores each prediction by giving it points not only in accordance
with whether the prediction is right or wrong but also in a way that reflects the degree
18The restricted regression includes all the independent variables discussed in Section 4.3.3 except
the rates of return to primary and middle school while the unrestricted regression includes the rates
of return to primary and middle school. The likelihood ratio (LR) test has the following null and
alternate hypotheses:
HO : βe = 0,HA : βe 6= 0
for e = {p, m}. In other words, the null hypothesis is that the restricted regression is correct
while the alternate hypothesis is that the unrestricted regression is correct. The LR test statistic is
calculated as 2 (LogLikelihoodUR − LogLikelihoodRR), which has a chi-square distribution. With
4 degrees of freedom (4 restrictions) the critical chi-square is 13.28 at the 1% level of significance.
A *** indicates that the LR test statistic is greater than the critical chi-square value and therefore
the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level of significance.
50
Table 4.2: Measures of Predictive Performance
Dependent Variable Pseudo R-Square ĪR
Restricted Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted
Work 0.1824 0.1836 0.1743 0.1753
School 0.2502 0.2508 0.2196 0.2201
of certainty of the prediction.19 The measure also corrects for the degrees-of-freedom
by penalizing specifications with more explanatory variables. This measure further
strengthens the results of the likelihood ratio test. ĪR increases slightly when the
rates of return to education are added as explanatory variables.
4.4.2 Rates of Return to Education
Tables C.12 and C.13 in Appendix C reports marginal effects for the binary probit
models for participation in child labor and schooling after correcting the standard
errors for clustering at the year-state level. The impact of the rates of return to
education on participation in child labor and schooling are summarized in Table 4.3.
The coefficient for boys is calculated as the sum of the coefficient for all children and
the interaction term with the male dummy. The significance level for boys is based
on the Wald test with the null hypothesis that the sum of these coefficients is zero.
We find a positive and significant relationship between increases in the rates of
return to primary and middle schooling and declines in child labor. The magnitude
of this relationship is large. For girls, a 1% increase in the middle to primary school
wage ratio per year of middle school is associated with a 10 percentage point decline
in child labor. For boys, a 1% increase in the primary to no school wage ratio per year
of primary school is associated with a 44 percentage point decline in child labor and
19For example, in the dichotomous case, more credit is given to a correct prediction that is close
to 1 than to a correct prediction that is close to 0.5.
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*Significant at 10%, **Significant at
5%, ***Significant at 1%. Robust stan-
dard errors are corrected for clustering
at the year-state level.
a 1% increase in the middle to primary school wage ratio per year of middle school
is associated with a 5 percentage point decline in child labor.20
We find a positive and significant relationship between increases in the rates of
return to primary and middle schooling and increases in schooling for boys. A 1%
increase in the primary to no school wage ratio per year of primary school is associated
with an almost 47 percentage point increase in schooling while a 1% increase in the
middle to primary school wage ratio per year of middle school is associated with a 13
percentage point increase in schooling amongst boys.
The gender differential observed in Table 4.3 can perhaps be attributed to the
persistence of traditional gender roles in India. Though women’s participation in
the work force has been steadily increasing over time, conservative and orthodox
beliefs persist in many regions in India. While education is expected to improve a
20The coefficient on the rate of return to education level e measures the change in probability that
a child works (attends school) with a 1% increase in the wage ratio of education level e to education


















where P is the probability that a child works (attends school).
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*Significant at 10%, **Significant at
5%, ***Significant at 1%. Robust stan-
dard errors are corrected for clustering
at the year-state level.
boy’s income-earning potential, for many girls education is expected to improve only
her marriage prospects. Also, while sons are expected to provide for their parents,
daughters are not. Therefore, boys’ participation in both child labor and schooling
respond strongly to higher benefits to their education in the labor market.
4.4.3 Year Dummies
Coefficients of the year dummies capture trends in participation in child labor and
schooling for boys and girls. As Table 4.4 shows, child labor and schooling are both
higher in 1988, 1993, and 1999, compared to the omitted year, 1983. From 1988
onwards, child labor has been decreasing and schooling increasing. The coefficient
for boys is calculated as the sum of the coefficient for all children and the interaction
term with the male dummy. The significance level for boys is based on the Wald test
with the null hypothesis that the sum of these coefficients is zero.
The year dummies capture a decreasing trend in child labor and an increasing
trend in schooling between 1988 and 1999. These trends are significantly different for
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boys and girls. Between 1988 and 1999, child labor has declined by 8 (4) percentage
points and schooling has increased by 14 (10) percentage points amongst girls (boys).
The year dummies could be capturing changes in education policies, for example
free primary education and the provision of school meals. Perhaps education policies
have a stronger effect on girls rather than boys because the base is lower for girls
- i.e. child labor was higher and schooling was lower amongst girls to begin with.
Therefore, there is more scope to lower child labor and increase schooling amongst
girls than boys. Cultural changes could also be playing a role in increasing schooling,
especially amongst girls.
The trends captured by the year dummies are reflected in actual changes in the
proportion of children participating in child labor and schooling between 1988 and
1999. Table 4.5 reports these changes.21
4.4.4 Control Variables
The control variables have the expected signs (except for a child’s age) and are mostly
significant at the 1% level.
We find that a higher number of children in the household makes a child more
likely to work. However, the number of children in a household is not a significant
determinant of a child’s participation in school. All children are less likely to work and
more likely to attend school if their father and/or mother have completed primary,
middle, high school or college. Two observations are interesting. First, the father’s
21The figures reported are the total number of hours spent working (market work, household
enterprise work, and domestic work) or attending school as a percentage of the total number of
hours spent in all activities (including hours spent doing nothing - i.e. neither work nor school) in
each group (boys or girls). The figures remain almost identical if we calculate the number of children
engaged in work or school as a proportion of all children in each group (boys or girls).
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The change in child labor and schooling
is in percentage points.
education has a stronger impact on children’s participation in work and school than
the mother’s education. Second, both parents’ education has a stronger impact on
participation in child labor and schooling for girls than for boys. Thus, our results
indicate that parental education increases educational investments in girls more so
than in boys.
Children residing in urban regions are less likely to work and more likely to attend
school. This urban bias is stronger for girls than for boys. In other words, the
difference in participation in child labor and schooling between urban and rural girls
is much larger than the difference between urban and rural boys. Being lowcaste or
Muslim increases the likelihood of child labor and decreases the likelihood of attending
school for both boys and girls, reflecting the widespread discrimination against these
groups.
All children are more likely to work and less likely to attend school if his or her
mother works outside the home. This effect is particularly strong for girls and can
be explained by the fact that working mothers often take their children, especially
daughters, with them to work or make their daughters perform household chores while
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they work. A higher log of per capita monthly household expenditure makes a child
less likely to work and more likely to attend school. Ownership of land has a negative
impact on boys’ participation in child labor and a positive impact on both boys’ and
girls’ participation in schooling.
There is a U-shaped (inverted-U-shaped) relationship between age and child labor
(schooling) - a child is less (more) likely to work (attend school) from the ages of 5
to 9 and then more (less) likely to work (attend school) from the ages of 9 to 14. In
most of the empirical literature on child labor, older children are found to be more
likely to work.
We find that boys are more likely to work than girls. Thus, after controlling for
the indirect effect that being male has on participation in child labor and schooling,
via household and individual characteristics, the direct effect of being male is the
opposite of what we expected.
4.5 Robustness
Table 4.3 shows the empirical evidence we find to validate the main predictions of
our theory for the case of India. In response to higher rates of return to education
child labor falls and schooling increases. In this section we show that our results are
robust to a variety of specifications and robustness checks.
4.5.1 Overcorrection of Standard Errors
The results reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are obtained after correcting the standard
errors for clustering at the year-state level. According to Moulton (1990), when esti-
mating the impact of aggregate variables on individual outcomes, unobservable char-
acteristics at the aggregate level can affect all observations within a cluster and inflate
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Table 4.6: Rates of Return to Education, Child Labor, and Schooling: Without








*Significant at 10%, **Significant at
5%, ***Significant at 1%. Standard er-
rors are not corrected for clustering at
the year-state level.
the statistical significance of the aggregate variable. In our case, the rates of return
to primary and middle school are calculated for each state in each year. Therefore,
correlations within each year-state combination must be accounted for. Correcting
the standard errors for clustering at the year-state level provide us with an estimator
of the variance covariance matrix which is consistent in the presence of any corre-
lation pattern within states over time. One drawback to this procedure, however,
is that the standard errors are over-corrected. The over-correction occurs because
all the intra-cluster correlations (i.e. the correlation within every year-state combi-
nation) are assumed to be significant. Without this correction, all the intra-cluster
correlations are assumed to be insignificant. In reality, the intra-cluster correlations
within some clusters are significant while others are not. Therefore, the true variance
covariance matrix lies in between these two extreme cases.
Without correcting the standard errors for clustering at the year-state level, the
rates of return to education are found to be far more significant determinants of
participation in child labor and schooling. The results are reported in Tables C.14
and C.15 in Appendix C and summarized in Table 4.6 below.
When we don’t correct the standard errors for clustering at the year-state level for
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both boys and girls, participation in full time or part time work and school respond
strongly to changes in the rates of return to both primary and middle school. The
results reported in Table 4.6 represent one extreme assumption (that the intra-cluster
correlation within every cluster is insignificant) while those presented in Table 4.3
represent the other extreme (that the intra-cluster correlation within every cluster is
significant). The true variance covariance matrix lies in between these two extreme
cases.
4.5.2 Other Robustness Checks
Children Engaged in Domestic Chores
In this section, we exclude children engaged in domestic chores from our definition of
child labor and include only those engaged in market or household enterprise work.
We do this in order to keep to the ILO’s definition of child labor. The results are
reported in Table C.16 in Appendix C and summarized in Table 4.7. We find a
significant decrease in child labor amongst girls brought about by higher rates of
return to middle school and a significant decrease in child labor amongst boys in
response to higher rates of return to primary school.
Full Time Work, Full Time School, and Part Time Work and School
To test the robustness of the empirical results, we use three different specifications
of child labor and schooling. The dependent variable ChildLabor − ftikjt equals 1
if a child is reported as working full time during the past 7 days and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, School−ftikjt equals 1 if a child attended school full time during the past 7
days and 0 otherwise. ChildLabor−School− ptikjt equals 1 if a child was engaged in
both work and school part time during the past 7 days and 0 otherwise. Tables C.17,
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Table 4.7: Rates of Return to Education & Child Labor: Excluding Children Engaged








*Significant at 10%, **Signif-
icant at 5%, ***Significant at
1%. Standard errors are cor-
rected for clustering at the
year-state level.
Table 4.8: Rates of Return to Education, Full Time Work, Full Time School, & Part
Time Work & School
Full Time Full Time Part Time
Work School Work & School
Girls
Primary 0.0147 -0.0498 -0.0011
Middle -0.0488 0.0710 -0.0011***
Boys
Primary -0.2710** 0.6581*** -0.0022*
Middle -0.0681 0.1147 0.0002
*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at
1%. Standard errors are not corrected for clustering at the
year-state level.
C.18, and C.19 in Appendix C report marginal effects for the binary probit models
for participation in child labor and schooling while the results are summarized in
Table 4.8. We find a significant decrease in part-time work and school amongst girls
as a result of higher rates of return to middle school. In response to higher rates of
return to primary school, boys are less likely to engage in full time work, more likely
to engage in full time school, and less likely to engage in part-time work and school.
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*Significant at 10%, **Significant at
5%, ***Significant at 1%. Standard er-
rors are not corrected for clustering at
the year-state level.
Endogeneity of Per Capita Household Expenditure
As an additional robustness check, we exclude the variable LogExpenditurekjt be-
cause per capita household expenditure could be endogenous. In other words, a
child’s participation in work could raise household income, household expenditure,
and thereby per capita household expenditure. Omitting this variable from the right
hand side does not significantly change the results. Tables C.20 and C.21 in Appendix
C report the results, which are summarized in Table 4.9. Higher rates of return to
middle school lower participation in child labor amongst girls while higher rates of
return to primary school lower child labor and increase schooling amongst boys.
Including the Rates of Return to High School & College
One can argue that in deciding whether to send their children to primary or middle
school or to work, parents respond to the returns to high school and college as well.
This argument is based on the fact that a child’s completion of primary and middle
school is necessary before he or she attends high school or college. To check the
validity of this argument we include the rates of return to high school and college as
determinants of participation in child labor and schooling. The results are reported in
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Table 4.10: Rates of Return to Education & Child Labor: Including Rates of Return












*Significant at 10%, **Significant at
5%, ***Significant at 1%. Standard er-
rors are not corrected for clustering at
the year-state level.
Tables C.22 and C.23 in Appendix C and summarized in Table 4.10. We find that the
rates of return to high school and college are statistically insignificant in determining
participation in child labor and schooling. Moreover, when the rates of return to
high school and college are included as explanatory variables, we find a negative and
significant association between the rates of return to primary school and child labor
amongst boys and a positive and significant association between the rates of return
to primary school and schooling amongst boys.
4.6 Conclusion
The empirical results presented here indicate that higher rates of return to education
decrease child labor and increase education amongst boys and decrease child labor
amongst girls. The rate of return to primary school has a strong impact on boys’
participation in child labor and schooling while girls’ participation in child labor re-
sponds to changes in the rate of return to middle school. In light of these results,
policies that raise the returns to education can have a beneficial impact on human
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capital investments in India by providing parents with the correct incentives to ed-
ucate their children. Such policies can be used to complement anti-child-labor and
compulsory education laws.
One way of raising the returns to education is by increasing the demand for skilled
labor via the creation of skilled-labor-intensive employment opportunities. Amongst
the policies that can be used to expand employment opportunities for educated work-
ers and raise the benefits to obtaining an education are the liberalization of trade
and investment. Rather than lower the demand for skilled labor, as the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem predicts, trade liberalization in developing countries can increase
the demand for skilled labor via the transfer of skill-biased technology. A greater
demand for skilled labor can raise the returns to education and foster greater invest-
ment in human capital. Without incentives for firms to invest in skill-biased capital,
however, trade liberalization may be insufficient to generate skill-biased investment
by firms.
4.7 Extension
In this essay we estimate and find a positive impact of the rates of return to education
on human capital investments. One could argue that the reverse direction of causation
holds, whereby higher human capital investments raise the rates of return to education
by attracting skill-biased investment by firms. For the case of India, two states
provide anecdotal evidence that this argument may not hold. Even though the states
of Kerala and Himachal Pradesh have the highest levels of education, there is very
little investment by firms. An interesting extension to this essay would be to estimate
the impact of human capital investments on investments by firms, or more specifically
on skill-biased investments by firms.
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Chapter 5
Changes in Returns to Education and Relative Wages in
India: Demand & Supply Factors
The determinants of the returns to education and relative wages can be broadly clas-
sified as demand-side factors, supply-side factors, and wage legislation. The objective
of this essay is to measure changes in relative wages and the returns to education in
India during the period 1983 to 1999 and to examine the extent to which demand
and supply changes can explain changes in relative wages. We focus on whether or
not India’s liberalization of trade and investment during this period has contributed
to changes in the relative wages of skilled and unskilled labor. One prediction of
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model is that trade liberalization should raise the de-
mand for and returns to the abundant factor - i.e. unskilled labor in India (Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem). However, India’s trade and investment liberalization reforms,
which began in the 1980s but were more thoroughly implemented since 1991, are
expected to have resulted in the transfer of skill-biased capital and technology from
developed or technologically more advanced countries, which works through capital-
and technology-skill complementarities to raise the demand for and returns to skilled
labor.
We first measure the overall change in relative wages and then determine to what
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extent these changes are explained by changes in wages by level of education, age,
and gender. Next, we examine in more detail the relationship between education
and wages by estimating the returns to education, using the selection bias correction
method developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001). Finally, we conduct a simple demand
and supply analysis using the non-parametric method proposed by Katz & Murphy
(1992).
Section 5.1 describes India’s 1991 economic reforms, which are expected to drive
variation in the relative wages and returns to education in the country. Section 5.2
describes our data. Section 5.3 reports changes in relative wages in India between
1983 and 1999 and Section 5.4 analyses changes in the returns to education during
this period. In Sections 5.5 and 5.6 we investigate the extent to which relative demand
and supply changes have contributed to changes in relative wages in India. Section
5.7 explores the role of international trade in contributing towards relative demand
changes during the 1980s and 1990s in India. Section 5.8 concludes.
5.1 Indian Economic Policies
India’s economic reforms began partially in the 1980s and were implemented more
thoroughly since 1991. These reforms included the liberalization of trade and invest-
ment as well as reforms in the public sector and industry. Two opposing predictions
of the impact of trade liberalization on relative wages in developing countries are
that unskilled wages should rise relative to skilled wages (according to the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem) and that skilled wages should rise relative to unskilled wages
(as a result of skill-biased technology transfer). Either way, trade and investment
liberalization is expected to change relative wages and the returns to education.
After gaining independence from Britain in 1947, India embarked on a socialist
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strategy of state-directed, heavy-industry based, and import substitution industri-
alization, which beginning in the early 1950s, was implemented through a series a
five-year plans. High levels of protection were provided to import-competing indus-
tries, primarily machinery and equipment, which were complemented by a system of
complex licensing and financial repression. Although some tentative steps were taken
in 1985 to liberalize and unshackle the economy by de-licensing a few industries,
these partial and rather ad hoc measures contributed to the creation of severe and
unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances (Joshi & Little 1997). Severe restrictions
on foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment before 1991 contributed
further to India’s economic stagnation.
Faced with a severe balance of payments crisis as foreign exchange reserves plum-
meted to US $1 billion in late June 1991, India entered into a structural adjustment
program with the International Monetary Fund. Along with stabilization policies that
combined fiscal tightening with exchange rate devaluation, the then finance minister,
Manmohan Singh, implemented a range of far-reaching economic policy reforms in
the industrial, external, investment, and public sectors.
The trade policy reforms aimed at liberalizing and promoting both exports and
imports. Exports were liberalized via the abolition of export subsidies and controls.
Imports were liberalized by a rapid reduction in tariff rates and the abolition of
licensing and quantitative restrictions on most imports except consumer goods. The
average ad valorem tariff rate fell from 125% in 1990 to 40% in 1999 (see Table C.24
in Appendix C).1 Within the manufacturing sector, the ad valorem tariff rates for
all goods declined during the 1990s, (see Table C.25 in Appendix C). The reforms
1The ad valorem tariff rate is reported as a percentage. If the ad valorem tariff rate is t and
the foreign price is p∗, then the domestic price, p, is p = p ∗ (1 + t). So if t = 12.5% then
p = p ∗ (1 + 1.25) = p ∗ (2.25) = 2.25p∗.
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reduced non-tariff barriers by eliminating quantitative restrictions - quotas and import
licensing requirements - particularly on capital and intermediate goods. The import
licensing regime was replaced by a negative list which listed all those goods that
could not be imported. Items not included on the list could be imported without
a license. In addition, technology imports were also liberalized in order to provide
Indian industries access to modern and efficient techniques of production. Technology
could be imported through the automatic route without any restrictions such as
technology license requirements.
As a result of lower tariffs, elimination of quotas and import license requirements,
and liberalization of technology imports, total exports and imports increased dramat-
ically during the 1990s (see Table C.26 in Appendix C). Imports as a percentage of
GDP doubled from 8% in 1985 to 16% in 2000 while exports as a percentage of GDP
almost tripled from 5% in 1985 to 14% in 2000.
There was an increasing trend in the country’s machinery imports from US$ 3.5
billion in 1988 to US$ 7.7 in 2000 (see Table C.27 in Appendix C). During this
period, machinery imports from Japan, USA, and Germany constituted the majority
of India’s capital goods imports (see Table C.28 in Appendix C). Other countries
from which India imported machinery consisted of the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea.2 Since these countries are developed
or technologically more advanced compared to India, it is reasonable to assume that
machinery imports from these countries embody skill-biased technology. There are
several reasons why capital goods imports might increase in developing countries after
trade liberalization. First and most importantly, a lower price of foreign machinery
2Table C.28 in Appendix C reveals a steady rise in India’s capital goods imports from other
countries - which include East and South-East Asian countries - perhaps because machinery from
these countries are better suited to the labor-intensive production techniques in India.
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and equipment, as a result of lower import tariffs, quotas, and licences, leads to
increased imports of capital goods. Second, as a result of greater exports, foreign
exchange constraints that may have existed under the old regime are relaxed, leading
to increases in capital goods imports. Third, by fostering competition in international
markets, trade liberalization might encourage domestic firms to modernize machinery
and production.
During the 1990s, India’s investment reforms liberalized FDI to a limited extent,
resulting in an increase of FDI from $233 million to $3.3 billion during this period.
Moreover, several Indian state governments implemented policies that attracted high
levels of foreign and domestic investment during the 1990s. These policies included
tax concessions, provision of land in industrial parks, and high quality infrastructure
and power supply. States that pursued pro-investment policies during the 1990s
include the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu, and the
western states of Gujarat and Maharashtra, which together attracted the bulk of FDI
between 1991 and 2002.
5.2 Data Source
The individual level data used in this study comes from the Employment and Un-
employment Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), which is
described in detail in Chapter 4 Section 4.2. The data covers four years - 1983, 1988,
1993, and 1999. We use data for individuals aged 15 years and above and create
two samples. First, we create a wage sample that we use to measure hourly wages
of workers by demographic group. Second, we create a count sample that we use to
measure the amount of labor supplied by these demographic groups. We divide our
data into 100 distinct labor groups, defined by 2 gender groups (male and female), 5
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education groups (less than primary, primary, middle, high school, and college), and
10 age groups (15-20, 20-25, 25-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45, 45-50, 50-55, 55-60, and 60+
years).3
The wage measure we use throughout this essay is the average hourly wage of
workers within a gender-education-age cell. An individual’s average hourly wage is
computed as total wages during the past week divided by total hours worked during
that week. We then adjust individual wages to 1988 Rupees. Our wage sample
includes regular wage and salary workers since wages are only reported for this group.
Self-employed workers (both wage and non-wage earning) are excluded from our wage
sample. The count sample includes all individuals who worked either as regular wage
and salary workers or as self-employed workers (wage and non-wage earning). The
amount of labor supplied by each demographic group is measured as the total hours
worked by each group as a proportion of the total hours worked by all groups in that
year. The total hours worked by each group is computed as the sum of hours worked
during the past week for all individuals within each gender-education-age cell.
We calculate relative wages, a (100 X 4) matrix Wr, and relative supply, a (100 X
4) matrix Xr, from our wage and count samples. Our wage data consists of a (100 X
4) matrix W , which consists of the average hourly wage (adjusted to 1988 Rupees)
from the wage sample for each of the 100 demographic groups in each of four years
(1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999). Our labor supply data consists of a (100 X 4) matrix
X, which consists of the proportion of hours worked from the count sample for each of
the 100 demographic groups in each of four years (1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999). From
X we construct a 100-element vector, N , of average employment shares of each group
3The total hours worked and average hourly wages of some groups are zero or missing as a result of
too few observations in these groups. This does not pose a problem, however, because we aggregate
relative wages, supply, and demand over broader groups.
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over the four years. We use this vector of fixed weights to construct wage indices for
each year as N ′W , a (1 X 4) matrix. Deflating wages in each year (W ) by the value
of the wage index for that year (N ′W ) generates relative wages for each demographic
group in each year, denoted by a (100 X 4) matrix Wr.
4
From Wr we calculate a 100-element vector, Ω, of average relative wages of each
group over the four years. The average of the relative wages of each demographic
group over the four years provides a natural basis for aggregating quantities of labor
supplied across groups in terms of efficiency units. We weight the employment share
of each group (X) by the average relative wage of that group (Ω) and sum over all
groups to construct a measure of the total labor supply in the economy in each year
in efficiency units, Ω′X, a (1 X 4) matrix. We then deflate actual labor supply (X)
by the total labor supply in the economy measured in efficiency units (Ω′X) for each
demographic group in each year to get a (100 X 4) relative supply matrix Xr.
5
5.3 Changes in Relative Wages in India
Table 5.1 reports average relative hourly wages for all workers, women, and men by
education levels and age and changes in relative wages for 6 periods between 1983
and 1999 in India. The average hourly wages reported are relative wages - i.e. each
group’s wage relative to the wages for a fixed bundle of workers - described in Section
5.2 and calculated from the (100 X 4) matrix Wr.
For the period between 1983 and 1999, relative wages of all workers with less
4Each group’s wage is indexed to the wages for a fixed bundle of workers (all workers who earned
a regular wage or salary). Thus, the relative wage for each group is measured as each group’s wage
relative to the wages for a fixed bundle of workers.
5Each group’s labor supply is measured relative to the total labor supply in the economy in
efficiency units.
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than primary, primary, and middle schooling decreased whereas those of high school
and college educated workers increased substantially. For women, relative wages of
workers with less than primary, primary, high school, and college education increased
while those of workers with middle schooling decreased substantially. For men, rela-
tive wages of workers with less than primary and primary education decreased while
those of middle, high school, and college educated workers increased.
For women, the rise in relative wages of both less and more educated workers
suggests that both the Stolper-Samuelson and skill-biased technology transfer effects
played a role. For men, on the other hand, the skill-biased technology transfer effect
seems to have dominated the Stolper-Samuelson prediction. Can the increase in
relative earnings of skilled workers be explained by firms’ higher demand for skilled
labor, as a result of the transfer of skill-biased technology after India’s liberalization
of trade and investment? We examine alternative explanations for changes in relative
wages in Section 5.5 to answer this question. Before doing so we explore the education-
wage relationship in more detail by estimating the returns to education for several
groups of individuals, industries, and occupations in India.
5.4 Changes in Returns to Education in India
Earnings regressions are estimated, after correcting for selection bias using the method
developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001), for several groups of individuals, industries,
and occupations for four years - 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999.6
6The empirical strategy in estimating the returns to education is identical to that described in
Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4. The difference here is that rather than estimate earnings regressions
separately for each state, we estimate earnings regressions for all adults, men, and women, and
for each industry or occupation. The right hand side variables are the same as in the second
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The return to education level e in group r and year t captures the percentage
increase in hourly wages earned by an individual with education level e compared to
an individual with education level (e− 1), and is calculated as:




where βert is the coefficient for the dummy for education level e in group r and year
t in the earnings regression. The subscript e represents primary, middle, high school,
and college education (e = {p, m, h, c})7, group r represents the individual, industry,
or occupation groups, and t represents four years (1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999).
5.4.1 Returns to Education for All Adults, Women, & Men
The returns to education for all adults, women, and men are reported in Table 5.2,
which are calculated from regression estimates given in Tables C.30, C.31, and C.32
in Appendix C.8 For the period between 1983 and 1999, returns to education for all
workers with primary, middle, and high school fell while returns to college educated
workers increased substantially. For women, returns to primary and college education
increased while returns to middle and high school education decreased. The pattern
for men follows that for all workers, with returns to primary, middle, and high school
decreasing and returns to college education increasing.
correction for selection bias in estimating the returns to education.
7High school consists of secondary school (grades 9 and 10) and higher secondary school (grades
11 and 12).
8See Table C.29 in Appendix C for the total hours spent and the number of individuals in each
category.
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Table 5.2: Returns to Education in India: 1983-1999
Group Year % Change
1983 1988 1993 1999 1983-88 1988-93 1993-99 1983-99
All Adults
Primary School 23.65 23.33 18.29 23.17 -1.37 -21.60 26.65 -2.06
Middle School 20.09 12.48 16.20 15.25 -37.87 29.77 -5.87 -24.11
High School 49.32 50.46 55.46 44.61 2.32 9.91 -19.58 -9.55
College 39.83 49.63 59.24 69.69 24.60 19.36 17.64 74.96
Women
Primary School 10.10 10.57 9.36 11.54 4.63 -11.42 23.24 14.22
Middle School 35.65 25.38 14.58 5.02 -28.81 -42.55 -65.58 -85.92
High School 91.90 84.69 104.01 91.31 -7.86 22.82 -12.21 -0.65
College 27.50 58.97 39.32 59.98 114.44 -33.33 52.55 118.10
Men
Primary School 34.66 34.33 19.60 20.92 -0.98 -42.91 6.74 -39.65
Middle School 31.12 27.44 16.64 22.48 -11.82 -39.36 35.09 -27.75
High School 49.29 44.77 45.86 44.33 -9.16 2.44 -3.34 -10.05
College 42.82 40.32 55.98 70.09 -5.82 38.84 25.19 63.69
5.4.2 Returns to Education by Industry
To explore our hypothesis - that the liberalization of trade and investment in In-
dia facilitated the transfer of skill-biased capital and technology, thereby raising the
demand for and returns to skilled labor - we estimate the returns to education for
18 industry and 3 occupation groups. We use three occupation groups to differen-
tiate between skilled (non-production or white-collar) and unskilled (production or
blue-collar) labor, which though imperfect is consistent with the methodology used
by Katz & Murphy (1992) and is the most common division between more and less
skilled workers using survey data (Lawrence & Slaughter (1993)). Table 5.3 illustrates
the classification of these groups.
Table 5.4 reports changes in returns to education by industry and occupation
groups which are calculated from Tables C.33, C.34, C.35, and C.36 in Appendix C.
Between 1983 and 1999 returns to primary school and college education increased for
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Table 5.3: Industry & Occupation Groups
Industry/Occupation Skill Level
Industry
1 agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing Low
2 mining and quarrying Low
3 manufacture of food, beverage, and tobacco products Low
4 manufacture of textiles, leather, fur, wearing apparel, and footwear Low
5 manufacture of wood and wood products Low
6 manufacture of paper, paper products, printing, and publishing Medium
7 manufacture of chemicals, rubber, plastic, petroleum, and coal products High
8 manufacture of non-metallic mineral products Medium
9 manufacture of basic metals, metal products, and metal parts Medium
10 manufacture of machinery and transport equipment and parts High
11 other manufacturing industries Medium
12 electricity, gas, steam, water works, and water supply Medium
13 construction Low
14 wholesale trade, retail trade, restaurants, and hotels Medium
15 transport, communications Medium
16 storage, warehousing, repair services Medium
17 financing, insurance, real estate, business services High
18 community, social, personal services, except repair services Medium
Occupation
1 professional, technical, administrative, executive, & managerial workers High
2 clerical & sales workers Medium
3 production & service workers Low
Industry 4 includes cotton, wool, silk, man made and synthetic fiber, and jute and other vegetable fiber
textiles. Occupational category 3 - i.e. production & service workers - includes farmers, fishermen, hunters,
loggers, and related workers.
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the majority of industries while returns to middle and especially high school decreased
for many industries. There was an increase in the returns to primary, middle, high
school, and college education for both high- and low-skill occupations for the 1983-
1999 period. For medium-skill occupations, however, returns to primary, middle, and
high school decreased while returns to college increased.
5.5 Alternative Explanations for Relative Wage Changes
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate large changes in relative wages and returns to education
amongst both women and men and amongst several industries during the 1980s and
1990s in India. While the liberalization of trade and investment in India could be
responsible for these changes by altering the relative demand for workers with different
levels of education, other factors could have brought about these changes as well.
Possible explanations for relative wage changes include not only relative demand
changes but also relative supply changes for workers with different levels of education
and changes in wage legislation during this period. We investigate relative supply
and demand changes as potential determinants of the variation in relative wages in
India.9
5.5.1 Changes in Relative Labor Supply
The decline in relative wages of some groups over the 1983-1999 period could have
resulted from a large increase in the supply of these workers. For the entire sample,
Table 5.5 shows a trend towards rising education levels during this period. Increases
9A third set of explanations for relative wage changes are related to wage legislation. We do not
explore wage legislation as a determinant of relative wage changes in this essay primarily because









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in education levels can be explained by the long term trend of rising education brought
about by greater economic development. Further, educational policies - such as higher
public expenditure on education, more schools, better accessibility to schools, an
improvement in the quality of education, and other incentives such as provision of
meals in schools - could be responsible for the rising trend in education during the
1980s and 1990s in India.
Table 5.5 summarizes changes in relative labor supply over the 1983-1999 period.
Each group’s supply is measured in efficiency units (actual hours multiplied by the
average relative wage of the group for the 1983-1999 period) and includes all workers
in the count sample described in Section 5.2. Each group’s supply is then measured
relative to the total supply in efficiency units in a given year. The figures in Table
5.5 represent changes in the log relative supply, multiplied by 100, for each group
over the relevant time period. We find a substantial increase in the relative supply of
more educated women and men and a decrease in the relative supply of less educated
women and men.
The relative supply of all workers with less than primary and primary schooling
declined in every time period while the relative supply of all workers with middle,
high school, and college education increased during the same time intervals. The
relative supply of women with less than primary schooling declined in every time
period while the relative supply of women with primary, middle, high school, and
college education increased in every period (except for the relative supply of women
with primary schooling, which decreased between 1993 and 1999). The relative supply
of men with less than primary, primary, and middle schooling decreased in all time
periods (except for the relative supply of men with middle schooling which increased
between 1993 and 1999) and the relative supply of men with high school and college
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education increased in all time periods.
5.5.2 Changes in Relative Labor Demand
Changes in relative wages throughout India can also be attributed to relative demand
changes during the 1983-1999 period. Changes in the demand for labor with different
education levels can be the result of changes in the sectoral composition of output,
which can be attributed primarily to changes in product demand. As described
in Section 5.1, during the 1980s and 1990s India’s economy experienced a massive
transformation whereby trade and investment were liberalized. India’s liberalization
of trade and investment is expected to have altered labor demand via two channels.
First, in the 2X2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, as protective import tariffs,
quotas, and licences are removed, the price of formerly protected goods will fall. By
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, a decrease in the relative price of a good will decrease
the relative price of the factor used intensively in the production of that good and
increase the relative price of the other factor. Since India is abundant in unskilled
labor and scarce in human and physical capital, trade liberalization is expected to have
lowered the price of human- and physical-capital-intensive goods, thereby decreasing
the relative price of human and physical capital and increasing the relative price of
unskilled labor. The argument is driven by the idea that once protective barriers are
removed, resources shift from the production of goods in which the country has an
artificial comparative advantage - i.e. human- and physical-capital-intensive goods
- towards the production and export of goods in which the country has a natural
comparative advantage - i.e. unskilled-labor-intensive goods in India.
Second, as a result of skill-biased technology transfer via trade and investment,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































changes in output away from unskilled-labor-biased to skilled-labor-biased produc-
tion technology. The use of more skill-biased machinery and technology via capital
goods and technology imports and foreign direct investment from more developed or
technologically advanced countries is expected to result in the transfer of skill-biased
technology. India’s leading import partners and foreign direct investment sources in-
clude developed or technologically advanced countries which are abundant in skilled
labor and tend to develop and utilize capital and technology that is biased towards the
use of skilled labor. Skill-biased technology transfer is expected to raise the demand
for and returns to skilled labor and lower the demand for and returns to unskilled
labor.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report average industry and occupation distributions for five
education groups each for men and women. The figures for each gender-education
group represent the share of employment (measured in hours worked during the pre-
ceding week) of that group in the corresponding industry or occupation averaged over
the four survey years. Large differences in employment shares by gender-education
groups suggest that shifts in labor demand across industries and occupations could
have a significant effect on the relative wages of these groups.
Table 5.8 reports employment distributions by industry and occupation (measured
in hours worked during the preceding week) for all gender-education groups together
and Table 5.9 shows changes in these distributions over the 1983-1999 period. Over
the entire period there was a large decrease in employment in agriculture, hunting,
forestry, and fishing. Smaller shifts in employment out of relatively low-skill industries
- i.e. mining and quarrying; manufacture of food products, beverages, and tobacco;
manufacture of textiles and textile products; manufacture of wood and wood products





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ers in these sectors, these shifts suggest that the demand for less-educated workers
should have fallen during this period. A small decrease in the share of employment
in the manufacture of non-metallic mineral products (a medium-skill sector) and in
the manufacture of machinery and equipment, transport equipment, and parts (a
high-skill sector) suggests that the demand for more-educated workers should have
fallen as well between 1983 and 1999. Increases in employment shares occurred in all
other sectors, the most significant being in construction; wholesale and retail trade,
restaurants and hotels; storage, warehousing, and repair services; and financing, in-
surance, real estate, and business services. While some of these sectors are relatively
low-skilled and others are high-skilled, these shifts suggest that the demand for both
less- and more-educated workers should have increased during this period.
Over the entire period there was a large shift out of clerical and sales occupations
(medium-skill) and a smaller shift out of production and service occupations (low-
skill) and a large shift into professional, technical, administrative, executive, and
managerial occupations (high-skill). These occupational changes suggest a fall in the
demand for medium- and low-skill workers and a rise in the demand for high-skill
workers.
5.6 Non-Parametric Method of Analysis
The non-parametric methodology proposed by Katz & Murphy (1992) provides a
simple framework for decomposing the extent to which relative supply and demand
changes contributed to relative wage changes in India. In Section 5.6.1 we test whether
relative labor supply changes alone can explain changes in relative wages by education
levels, or, instead, relative labor demand changes must have been non-neutral or















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.6.1 Relative Supply Versus Relative Demand Changes
Using our measures for relative wages (Wr) and relative supply (Xr) described in
Section 5.2, we first test whether relative labor supply changes alone can explain
changes in relative wages by education levels, or, instead, relative labor demand
changes must have been non-neutral or factor-biased.
In the Katz & Murphy (1992) framework, the aggregate production function con-
sists of K types of labor inputs.10 The vector of associated labor demands can be
written as:
Xt = D (Wt, Zt) (5.2)
where Xt is a (K X 1) vector of labor inputs employed in the market in year t, Wt
is a (K X 1) vector of market prices for these inputs in year t, and Zt is a (K X 1)
vector of demand shift variables in year t. The demand shift variables in Zt embody
the effects of technology, other non-labor inputs such as capital, and product demand
on the demand for labor inputs.
Equation 5.2 can be written in terms of differentials as:
dXt = DwdWt + DzdZt (5.3)
Under the assumption that the aggregate production function is concave, the (KxK)
matrix of cross-price effects Dw is negative semidefinite which implies that
dW ′t (dXt −DzdZt) = dW ′tDwdWt ≤ 0 (5.4)
10In our analysis K represents 100 distinct labor groups, defined by 2 gender groups (male and
female), 5 education groups (less than primary, primary, middle, high school, and college), and 10
age groups (15-20, 20-25, 25-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45, 45-50, 50-55, 55-60, and 60+ years).
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which says that changes in factor supplies (dXt) net of demand shifts (DzdZt) and
changes in wages (dWt) must negatively covary. We can therefore test whether or
not supply shifts alone can explain changes in relative wages. If factor demand is
stable (i.e. Zt is fixed or dZt = 0) then Equation 5.4 implies that dW
′
tdXt ≤ 0. If we
compare two years s and t, and find that
(Wt −Ws)′ (Xt −Xs) ≤ 0 (5.5)
then the observed changes in relative wages can potentially be explained solely by
supply shifts. In other words, if the inequality in Equation 5.5 holds then the period
between years s and t could have experienced a fixed factor demand which would
have had no impact on relative wages. If the inequality in Equation 5.5 does not
hold, then supply shifts alone cannot explain relative wage changes. Instead, non-
neutral or factor-biased demand shifts must also have played a role in explaining
relative wage changes.
The inequality in Equation 5.5 being satisfied does not mean that relative de-
mand changes did not occur. The inequality in Equation 5.5 is satisfied when
dW ′t (dXt −DzdZt) < 0 which can occur if either dWt < 0 and (dXt −DzdZt) > 0
or if dWt > 0 and (dXt −DzdZt) < 0. In the first case, relative wages for a group
fall (dWt < 0) while the relative supply change net of the relative demand change
is positive ((dXt −DzdZt) > 0). This can occur in two ways. First, relative sup-
ply increased while relative demand remained constant, increased but by less than
the increase in relative supply, or decreased and reinforced the relative supply in-
crease. Second, relative demand decreased while relative supply remained constant,
decreased but by less than the decrease in relative demand, or increased and rein-
forced the relative demand decrease. In the second case, relative wages for a group
rise (dWt > 0) while the relative supply change net of the relative demand change
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is negative ((dXt −DzdZt) < 0). This can occur in two ways. First, relative supply
decreased while relative demand remained constant, decreased but by less than the
decrease in relative supply, or increased and reinforced the relative supply decrease.
Second, relative demand increased while relative supply remained constant, increased
but by less than the relative demand increase, or decreased and reinforced the relative
demand increase.
If the inequality in Equation 5.5 does not hold, then relative demand changes
must have occurred. When dW ′t (dXt −DzdZt) > 0, the inequality in Equation 5.5
is not satisfied. This can occur if either dWt < 0 and (dXt −DzdZt) < 0 or if
dWt > 0 and (dXt −DzdZt) > 0. In the first case, relative wages for a group fall
(dWt < 0) and the relative supply change net of the relative demand change is negative
((dXt −DzdZt) < 0). The only way relative wages can fall with a constant relative
demand is if relative supply increases, which would make the relative supply change
net of the relative demand change positive. In the second case, relative wages for
a group rise (dWt > 0) while the relative supply change net of the relative demand
change is positive ((dXt −DzdZt) > 0). The only way relative wages can rise with
a constant relative demand is if relative supply decreases, which would make the
relative supply change net of the relative demand change negative.
We test the stable relative demand hypothesis by computing the inner products
of changes in relative wages and changes in relative supplies for the 100 gender-
education-age groups (Wt −Ws)′ (Xt −Xs) for six time periods - 1983-1988, 1983-
1993, 1983-1999, 1988-1993, 1988-1999, and 1993-1999. The results of our test are
presented in Table 5.10. Five of the six comparisons are positive and therefore reject
a stable relative demand hypothesis. These results indicate that between 1983 and
1988 there is a possibility that relative demand was stable and therefore did not affect
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Table 5.10: Inner Products of Changes in Relative Wages with Changes in Relative
Supplies: 1983-1999
1983-1988 1983-1993 1983-1999 1988-1993 1988-1999 1993-1999
-0.032555 0.005575 0.023470 0.020604 0.040608 0.000422
relative wages. For all other periods, shifts in relative demand played an important
role in relative wage changes in India. Figure 5.1 illustrates these results by plotting
changes in log relative wages against changes in log relative supplies for the 100 labor
groups for each of the six periods. The lines drawn in the figures are predicted values
from weighted least squares regressions of changes in log relative wages on changes in
log relative supplies for each time period, using employment shares of each group in
the initial period as weights. These six graphs reinforce our findings from the inner
products - for five periods, the groups with the largest increases in relative labor
supplies had the largest increases in relative wages. This relationship is strongest for
the 1988-1999 period, followed closely by the 1983-1999 and 1988-1993 periods. These
findings indicate that relative demand changes were a significant factor in bringing
about relative wage changes during the 1980s and 1990s in India.
5.6.2 Between- & Within-Sector Demand Changes
To explore the role of relative demand changes in relative wage changes we focus on
two types of demand changes - those that occur between industries (shifts that change
the allocation of labor demand between industries at fixed relative wages) and those
that occur within industries (shifts that change the allocation of labor demand within
industries at fixed relative wages). Important sources of both between- and within-
sector demand changes include skill-biased technology transfer, changes in prices of
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Figure 5.1: Wage & Supply Changes for 100 Groups: 1983-1999
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non-labor inputs such as capital, changes in product demand, and changes in the
composition of domestic output.
The between- and within-sector demand shift measures proposed by Katz & Mur-
phy (1992) are based on the fixed coefficients manpower requirements index (Freeman
(1980)). This index measures the percentage change in the demand for a demographic
group as the weighted average of the percentage employment growth by industry,
where the weights are the industrial employment distribution for the demographic

















where k indexes demographic groups and j indexes sectors. ∆Xdk is the change in
demand for group k, Ej is total labor input in sector j, ∆Ej is the change between




is group k’s share of total employment in sector j in the base period. The
employment measures Ek and Ej are in efficiency units.
11 We turn Equation 5.6 into
an index of relative demand shifts by normalizing the employment measures Ek and
Ej so that total employment in efficiency units in each year sums to one. We use the
average of the four survey years to be our base period. Thus, we use the average share
of total employment in sector j of group k over the 1983-1999 period as our measure
of αjk and the average share of group k in total employment over the 1983-1999 period
as our measure of Ek.
We use Equation 5.6 to calculate overall, between, and within sector demand
shifts based on employment in 18 industries and 3 occupations (defined in Table 5.3).
11For the employment measures Ek and Ej , we weight the total labor input (hours worked) of
each group or sector by the average relative wage of that group or sector to construct measures of
labor demand in efficiency units.
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We define our overall (industry-occupation) demand shift index for group k, ∆Xdk ,
as the index given in Equation 5.6 when j indexes our 48 industry-occupation cells.
We also decompose this index into between- and within-industry components. The
between-industry demand shift index for group k, ∆Xbk, as the index given in Equation
5.6 when j indexes the 18 industries. The within-industry demand shift index for
group k, ∆Xwk , is calculated as the difference between the overall demand shift index
and the between-industry demand shift index (i.e. ∆Xwk = ∆X
d
k − ∆Xbk). The
within-industry demand shifts reflect shifts in employment among occupations within
industries. Table 5.11 reports relative demand shift estimates for 10 demographic
groups and for 6 time periods. Between-sector demand shifted away from women with
less than primary, primary, and middle schooling in favor of women with high school
and college education in most time periods. In the periods 1983-1988 and 1983-1999
between-sector demand for women with high school and college education decreased.
Between-sector demand for women with middle school education increased between
1983 and 1988. Between-sector demand for men with less than primary, primary, and
middle schooling decreased in all time periods with one exception. Between 1983 and
1999, between-sector demand for men with primary schooling increased. For men
with high school and college education, between-sector demand increased in every
time period. The decline in between-sector relative demand for less educated men
and women is consistent with the large shift out of agriculture, hunting, forestry, and
fishing during the 1983-1999 period (see Table 5.9). Similarly, the growth in between-
sector relative demand for more educated men and women is consistent with the shift
into medium- (wholesale & retail trade, restaurants & hotels) and high-skill services
(financing, insurance, real estate, & business services).
Within-sector demand also shifted away from women and men with less than
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primary, primary, and middle schooling in favor of women and men with high school
and college education in most time periods. The exceptions are during 1983-1988
when within-sector demand for women with middle schooling increased and high
school and college education decreased. Within-sector demand for men with high
school education decreased during 1983-1993, 1983-1999, and 1993-1999. The decline
in within-sector relative demand for less educated men and women is consistent with
the substantial shift out of medium- (clerical and sales) and low-skill (production
and service) occupations, while the growth in within-sector relative demand for more
educated men and women is consistent with the growth in importance of high-skill
occupations (professional, technical, administrative, executive, & managerial).
Overall demand shifted away from women and men with less than primary, pri-
mary, and middle schooling in favor of women and men with high school and college
education in every time period.
In assessing these results, two factors must be taken into account. First, as noted
in Katz & Murphy (1992), the between-sector demand shift index is a biased measure
of between-industry demand shifts because it does not measure demand shifts only
at fixed relative wages, but also includes demand shifts brought about by changing
relative wages. Output shares of sectors that intensively employ labor groups with
relative wage increases (decreases) are likely to fall (rise). Therefore, the bias term for
relative wage increases (decreases) is negative (positive). The measured demand shift
equals the true demand shift plus the bias term, where the true demand shift only
measures shifts in demand at fixed relative wages. For example, between 1983 and
1988 relative wages for women with less than primary schooling increased (see table
5.1), which would tend to reduce output and labor demand in sectors that employ
these women intensively, making the bias term negative. Table 5.11 indicates that
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Table 5.11: Sector & Occupation Based Relative Demand Shifts: 1983-1999
Group 83-88 83-93 83-99 88-93 88-99 93-99
Between Sector Shift
Women
< Primary School -2.25 -3.30 -2.90 -5.74 -9.06 -6.44
Primary School -1.04 -3.49 -1.79 -4.62 -6.62 -5.44
Middle School 0.11 -1.33 -0.73 -1.21 -1.97 -2.08
High School -0.68 5.89 -2.03 5.30 3.50 4.12
College -0.08 8.25 -1.46 8.18 6.97 7.04
Men
< Primary School -1.55 -3.34 -1.23 -5.01 -6.40 -4.67
Primary School -0.06 -2.33 0.50 -2.40 -1.87 -1.80
Middle School -0.31 -1.74 -0.18 -2.06 -2.25 -1.93
High School 0.78 1.53 0.80 2.28 3.04 2.30
College 1.53 3.92 1.28 5.32 6.45 5.09
Within Sector Shift
Women
< Primary School -1.72 -0.10 -1.91 -1.83 -3.82 -2.02
Primary School -1.83 -0.11 -2.03 -1.94 -4.06 -2.14
Middle School -1.07 0.55 -1.19 -0.51 -1.72 -0.62
High School 0.80 -0.25 0.74 0.56 1.29 0.50
College 1.86 -0.30 2.26 1.58 3.76 1.98
Men
< Primary School -2.06 -0.02 -1.75 -2.07 -3.91 -1.77
Primary School -1.77 -0.07 -1.52 -1.84 -3.43 -1.59
Middle School -1.43 -0.08 -1.81 -1.51 -3.39 -1.89
High School 0.53 -0.01 -0.01 0.52 0.51 -0.02
College 2.97 0.77 2.78 3.69 6.25 3.50
Overall Shift (industry & occupation)
Women
< Primary School -3.68 -3.36 -3.03 -7.35 -10.96 -6.64
Primary School -1.83 -2.41 -1.00 -4.35 -5.45 -3.46
Middle School -1.75 -1.82 -2.00 -3.65 -5.83 -3.91
High School 1.30 1.52 0.79 2.78 3.51 2.28
College 4.40 4.63 3.98 8.60 11.89 8.22
Men
< Primary School -4.07 -3.41 -4.95 -7.83 -13.82 -8.79
Primary School -2.91 -3.61 -3.91 -6.78 -11.38 -7.87
Middle School -0.96 -0.76 -1.94 -1.74 -3.76 -2.74
High School 0.13 5.68 -1.26 5.79 4.70 4.58
College 1.78 8.01 0.88 9.49 10.20 8.73
The reported numbers are of the form log(1 + ∆Xsk) ∗ 100, where s represents between-
sector (b), within-sector (w), and overall (d) demand.
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between-sector demand for women with less than primary schooling fell between 1983
and 1988. Because the measured demand decline includes the negative bias term, it
overstates the true demand decline (i.e. the negative bias term strengthens the true
demand decline). On the other hand, between 1993 and 1999 relative wages for women
with less than primary schooling decreased (see Table 5.1), which we expect to have
increased output and labor demand in sectors that employ these women intensively,
making the bias term positive. Table 5.11 shows that between-sector demand for
this group decreased during 1993-1999. The measured demand decline in this case
understates the true demand decline (i.e. the positive bias term counteracts the true
demand decline).
Second, because the within-sector demand shifts proposed by Katz & Murphy
(1992) measure shifts in employment between only 3 occupation groups, they might
not capture the full effect of within-sector changes in relative demand. We would
require more detailed information in the skill content of occupations within industries
to obtain more precise within-sector demand shift estimates.
5.7 Demand Shifts Arising From International Trade
In this section we examine the extent to which international trade in manufactured
goods was a source of relative demand shifts during the 1980s and 1990s in India.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Theorem predicts a rise in the relative demand for
less-skilled workers and a fall in the relative demand for more-skilled workers. On
the other hand, as a result of the transfer of skill-biased technology via capital goods
imports and investment, we expect a rise in the relative demand for more skilled
workers and a fall in the relative demand for less-skilled workers.
Following Katz & Murphy (1992) we estimate the labor supply equivalents of trade
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(i.e. the implicit labor supply embodied in trade) by transforming trade flows into
labor supply equivalents on the basis of the utilization of labor inputs in the domestic
manufacturing industries. We measure only the direct labor supply embodied in trade
and ignore the input-output effects. Therefore, the implicit labor supply in trade is
the labor input required to produce traded output domestically.
We measure Lkt , the implicit labor supply of demographic group k embodied in











where i indexes 16 manufacturing industries, k indexes 10 demographic groups (2
gender and 5 education groups), and t indexes 4 years. eki is the average proportion
of employment in industry i amongst workers in group k over the 1983-1999 period,
Eit is the share of employment in industry i in year t (
∑
i
Eit = 1), Iit is net imports
in industry i in year t (Importsit−Exportsit), and Yit is output in industry i in year
t. Positive net imports imply that the country is importing more foreign labor than
it is exporting domestic labor, which will result in a fall in domestic labor demand.12
We measure T kt , the effect of trade on relative demand for group k in year t as:





















where Ek is the average share of total employment of group k over the 1983-1999
period.13 The first term in Equation 5.8 is the implicit labor supply of group k
embodied in trade, normalized by base year employment of group k (Ek) with the
sign reversed to convert the supply shift measure into a demand shift measure. The
12eki and Eit are measured in efficiency units by weighting the total labor input (hours worked) of
each group or sector by the average relative wage of that group or sector.
13Ek is measured in efficiency units by weighting the total labor input (hours worked) of each
group by the average relative wage of that group.
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Table 5.12: Relative Demand Shifts Predicted by Changes in International Trade in
Manufactures: 1983-1999
Group 83-88 83-93 83-99 88-93 88-99 93-99
Women
< Primary School -0.006 0.022 0.011 0.027 0.017 -0.011
Primary School -0.048 -0.237 -0.285 -0.189 -0.237 -0.048
Middle School -0.063 -0.355 -0.392 -0.292 -0.329 -0.037
High School -0.022 -0.133 -0.124 -0.112 -0.103 0.009
College 0.010 0.046 0.080 0.035 0.070 0.035
Men
< Primary School -0.022 -0.038 -0.085 -0.016 -0.064 -0.048
Primary School -0.048 -0.184 -0.263 -0.136 -0.216 -0.080
Middle School -0.023 -0.069 -0.114 -0.047 -0.092 -0.045
High School 0.004 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.004 -0.007
College 0.016 0.046 0.064 0.029 0.047 0.018





t , where t and t
′ represent different
years and t′ > t.
second term adjusts the demand shift measure so that trade affects only relative
demands for labor.14 We use data on imports, exports, and output by industry for
the years 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999 from the Trade & Production Database, provided
by the World Bank. These data cover 3-digit ISIC manufacturing industries, which
we aggregate into 16 industry groups (see Table C.37 in Appendix C).
Table 5.12 presents our estimated changes in relative demand predicted by changes
in international trade in manufactures for 10 demographic groups over 6 time periods.
For the period between 1983 and 1999, Table 5.12 shows that international trade in
manufactures predicts large decreases in relative demand for women. For women with
less than primary schooling, international trade in manufactures predicts a rise in
relative demand. International trade in manufactures has decreased relative demand
for men with less than primary, primary, and middle school education and increased
relative demand for those with high school and college education.
14Refer to Murphy & Welch (1991) for details of this demand shift index.
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Table 5.13: Changes in Relative Wages, Supply, & Demand, and Relative Demand
Shifts Predicted by Changes in International Trade in Manufactures: 1983-1999
Group Relative Relative Relative Demand Shifts
Wages Supply Demand Predicted by
Trade
Women
< Primary School 3.89 -19.38 -3.03 0.011
Primary School 7.31 10.84 -1.00 -0.285
Middle School -20.47 42.27 -2.00 -0.392
High School 17.79 41.58 0.79 -0.124
College 25.70 44.85 3.98 0.080
Men
< Primary School -5.95 -25.86 -4.95 -0.085
Primary School -5.94 -18.87 -3.91 -0.263
Middle School 13.72 0.84 -1.94 -0.114
High School 0.22 20.17 -1.26 0.007
College 4.70 25.61 0.88 0.064
Relative wage changes are the percentage change in relative wages between 1983 and
1999. The reported numbers for relative supply changes are of the form ∆(logXr) ∗ 100,
where Xr represents relative supply. The reported numbers for relative demand changes
are of the form log(1 + ∆Xdk ) ∗ 100, where X
d
k represents overall demand. For relative
demand shifts predicted by changes in international trade, the reported numbers are of





t , where t and t
′ represent different years and t′ > t.
5.8 Conclusion
Our analysis in this chapter documents several interesting changes in relative wages
and how relative supply and demand contributed to these changes in India. We
summarize our results in Table 5.13 for the period 1983-1999.
For the period 1983-1999, we find that relative wages of women rose between 1983
and 1999 except for women with middle schooling and relative wages of less educated
men fell while those of more educated men rose. We cannot reject the stable demand
hypothesis for the period 1983-1988 but find that relative demand changes played a
significant role in changing relative wages in all other periods, including the entire
period from 1983 to 1999.
The relative supply of uneducated women declined while relative supplies of women
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with primary, middle, high school, and college education increased during this period.
For men, relative supplies of men with less than primary and primary schooling de-
clined while relative supplies of men with middle, high school, and college education
increased. Overall demand shifted away from women with less than primary, primary,
and middle schooling and towards women with high school and college education.
Overall demand shifted away from men with no or any schooling but in favor of men
with college education.
We find that international trade in manufactures raised firms’ relative demand
for women with college education and men with high school and college education.
However, trade in manufactures also raised firms’ relative demand for uneducated
women and lowered it for women with primary, middle, and high school education.
This suggests that even though the transfer of skill-biased technology via trade and
investment has contributed to firms’ relative demand for more educated men and
women, the Stolper-Samuelson effect has also played a role by raising firms’ relative
demand for uneducated women.
For both women and men, relative wages of skilled workers (workers with high
school and college education) rose during the 1980s and 1990s in India. The rise in
relative wages was far greater for women than for men. This finding suggests that
skill-biased technology transfer did indeed play a role after India’s liberalization of
trade and investment and that skilled women benefited more than skilled men. While
relative wages of men with middle schooling increased, relative wages of women with
middle schooling decreased substantially. Perhaps the decrease in relative wages of
women with middle schooling was the result of a large increase in the supply of
this group combined with a substantial fall in the demand for this group. We find
that international trade changes brought about the largest decline in the demand for
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women with middle schooling.
The rise in relative wages of women with no or primary education could be the
result of a relatively low supply of these groups in relation to their demand. On the
other hand, the fall in relative wages of men with no or primary schooling suggests a
relatively high supply of these groups in relation to demand for their demand. The
creation and expansion of export-processing zones that engage in low-skill production
techniques and employ mostly women coincides with India’s liberalization of trade
and investment during the 1983-1999 period and provides one explanation for this
gender differential. These findings indicate that the Stolper-Samuelson effect played
a role for women but not for men during this time period in India.
Two factors that we expect to have raised demand for and relative wages of more
educated women and men is foreign direct investment and service sector employment
brought about by developed countries outsourcing medium- and high-skill activities to
India. For future research, an analysis of relative demand shifts predicted by changes
in foreign direct investment and outsourcing might shed some light on these critical




A.1 Proof of Proposition 1













Where θ = α
Γ+1−α .
(i) The optimal investment levels in the first best case, eFBp and k
FB
f , have unique
solutions. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium in the first best case.
(ii) The optimal investments of worker p and firm f are increasing in worker p’s





























Rf = (1− α)A (ephp)α k1−αf (A.2b)
The returns to worker p and firm f are increasing in worker p’s quality of education
and decreasing in worker p’s cost of education and in firm f ’s cost of capital for each





















































































1From here on dX = 0 means that all exogenous variables except the one under consideration
are held constant.
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Vf = (1− α)A (ephp)α k1−αf − µfkf (A.3b)
The welfare of worker p and firm f are increasing in worker p’s quality of education





























































(iii) The optimal investments, returns, and welfare of worker p and firm f are
independent of the distribution of workers and firms. The proof follows directly from
the fact that the optimal investment levels of worker p and firm f depend only on
their own parameters and the parameters of the agent that each is paired with.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In the decentralized case with search and random matching, the optimal investments














Where θ = α
Γ+1−α .
(i) The optimal investment levels in the decentralized case with homogeneous
agents, e∗ and k∗, have unique solutions. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium in
the decentralized case with homogeneous agents.
(ii) The first best equilibrium investment levels are independent of β and (1− β)
while the decentralized equilibrium investment levels depend on these shares. Because
0 < β < 1, it follows that e∗ < eFB and k∗ < kFB. So the optimal investment levels
are inefficient in the decentralized case with homogeneous agents.
(iii) The optimal investments of all workers and firms are increasing in the quality
of education for all workers and decreasing in the cost of education for all workers



















The returns to all agents are:
W = βA (eh)α k1−α (A.5a)
R = (1− β)A (eh)α k1−α (A.5b)
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The returns to all workers and firms are increasing in the quality of education for
all workers and decreasing in the cost of education for all workers and in the cost of





















































































The payoffs of all agents are:




V = (1− β)A (eh)α k1−α − µk (A.6b)
The welfare of all workers and firms are increasing in the quality of education for
all workers and decreasing in the cost of education for all workers and in the cost of
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In the decentralized case with search and random matching, the optimal investments
for type i worker and type j firm are:
e∗1 =
(
αβ ((1− α)(1− β))(1−α)/α A1/α
)1/Γ (
ρ (µ1)










αβ ((1− α)(1− β))(1−α)/α A1/α
)1/Γ (
ρ (µ1)












αβ ((1− α)(1− β))1/θ A(Γ+1)/α
)1/Γ (
ρ (µ1)



















−θ + (1− λ) (h2)θ(Γ+1) (c2)−θ
)1/θΓ (A.7d)
Where θ = α
Γ+1−α .
(i) The optimal investment levels in the decentralized case with heterogeneous
agents, e∗i and k
∗
j , for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, have unique solutions. Therefore, there is
a unique equilibrium in the decentralized case with uncertainty.
(ii) and (iii) The optimal investments of type i worker and type j firm, for i = 1, 2
and j = 1, 2, are increasing in the quality of education for all workers and decreasing
in the cost of education for all workers and in the cost of skill-biased technology for all
firms. The optimal investments of type i worker and type j firm are also increasing































The returns to all agents are:
Wi = βA (eihi)
α (ρk1−α1 + (1− ρ)k1−α2 ) (A.8a)
Rj = (1− β)Ak1−αj (λ (e1h1)
α + (1− λ) (e2h2)α) (A.8b)
The returns to type i worker and type j firm, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, are increasing
in the quality of education for all workers and decreasing in the cost of education for
all workers and the cost of skill-biased technology for all firms. The returns to type
i worker and type j firm are also increasing in the proportion of high-skilled workers
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The expected payoffs of all agents are:
E (Ui) = W0 + βA (eihi)
α [ρk1−α1 + (1− ρ)k1−α2 ]− ci e1+Γi1 + Γ (A.9a)
E (Vj) = R0 + (1− β)Ak1−αj [λ (e1h1)
α + (1− λ) (e2h2)α]− µjkj (A.9b)
The welfare of type i worker and type j firm, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, are increasing
in the quality of education for all workers and decreasing in the cost of education for
all workers and the cost of skill-biased technology for all firms. The welfare of type
i worker and type j firm are also increasing in the proportion of high-skilled workers
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Given the four possible outcomes, if the firm chooses to invest, the parent will
choose to invest if βAk1−α1 (h
α − (eh)α) > γW0 + c. If the firm chooses not to invest,
the parent will choose not to invest if βAk1−α0 (h
α − (eh)α) < γW0+c. Similarly, if the





µ (k1 − k0). If the parent chooses not to invest, the firm will choose not to invest if




< µ (k1 − k0). The full-investment and no-investment
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equilibria exist if both the following conditions hold simultaneously.
βAk1−α1 (h











(ii) The full-investment equilibrium Pareto dominates the no-investment one.
For the parent,
βAhαk1−α1 − βA (eh)
α k1−α1 > γW0 + c
βAhαk1−α1 − βA (eh)
α k1−α0 > γW0 + c
βAhαk1−α1 − c > γW0 + βA (eh)
α k1−α0
U11 > U00.
Similarly, for the firm,
(1− β)Ahαk1−α1 − (1− β)Ahαk1−α0 > µ (k1 − k0)
(1− β)Ahαk1−α1 − (1− β)A (eh)
α k1−α0 > µ (k1 − k0)





Correction of Wage Equations for Sample Selection Bias
Consider the following equations for the earnings regression (Equation B.1a) and the
selection process into wage employment (Equation B.1b):1
ys = xsβs + µs (B.1a)
y∗s = zsγs + ηs (B.1b)
where ys is earnings (the outcome variable) and y
∗
s is employment status (the selection
variable) and s is a categorical variable representing an individual’s choice between
M alternatives, s = 1, ...,M . The variables xs and zs are exogenous, where xs is a
subset of zs in order to identify the earnings equation. The error term in the earnings
regression, µs, has E (µs|x, z) = 0 and V (µs|x, z) = σ2.








Equation B.2 is equivalent to:
zsγs > εs (B.3)









Assume now that the η’s are independent and identically Gumbel distributed.
Thus, their cumulative and density functions are respectively G (η) = exp (−e−η) and
g (η) = exp (−η − e−η). As shown by McFadden (1974), this specification leads to
the multinomial logit model with:





where P (y∗s) is the probability that category s was chosen. Based on this expression,
maximum likelihood estimates of the γj’s can be easily obtained.
Because the error terms µs and ηs’s are correlated, ordinary least squares esti-
mates of βs are inconsistent. To obtain consistent estimates of β4, since the observed
outcome belongs to category s = 4, Bourguignon et al. (2001) propose estimating the
following model. Define the following standard normal variables for s = 1, ..., 4:
η∗s = J (ηs) = Φ
−1 (G (ηs)) (B.6)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. For every s, assume that the
expected values of µ4 and η
∗
s are linearly related. If ρ̃s is the correlation coefficient
between µ4 and η
∗
s , i.e. ρ̃s =
σ4η∗s
σ4ση∗s
(where σ4η∗s is the correlation between µ4 and η
∗
s ,
σ4 is the standard deviation of µ4, and ση∗s is the standard deviation of η
∗
s) then µ4






s + ω4 (B.7)
where ω4 is an error term which is orthogonal to all the η
∗
s ’s and E (ω4) = 0. This
expression uses the fact that the η∗s ’s are independent from each other. In order
to make the earnings regression, B.1a, estimable through ordinary least squares for
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s = 4, it is necessary to know the expectation of µ4 conditional on the fact that
category s = 4 is observed. Using the preceding relationships and the independence

























































J (η4)g (η4 + log P4) dη4 (B.10)
where Ps = P (y
∗











J (v − log P4)g (v) dv (B.11)
For η∗s , s 6= 4,
E
(

































Let v = ηs + log Ps and notice that
∫
J (ηs) g (ηs)dηs = E (η
∗
s) = 0. Then,
E
(









J (v − log Ps)g (v) dv (B.13)
For convenience, let m (Ps) =
∫
J (v − log Ps)g (v) dv,∀s. Substituting equations B.11




















Replacing the error term in the earnings regression (Equation B.1a) by its conditional
expected value (Equation B.14) and a residual term (ν4) gives:











where ρ̃s is the correlation coefficient between µ4 and η
∗
s , i.e. ρ̃s =
σ4η∗s
σ4ση∗s
, Ps = P (y
∗
s)
is the probability that category s was chosen, m (Ps) =
∫
J (v − log Ps)g (v) dv, v =
ηs + log Ps, and J (◦) = Φ−1 (G (◦)), for s = 1, ..., 4.
The error term ν4 is now orthogonal to all other terms on the RHS and has zero
expectation. Because of this property ordinary least squares may now be used to
provide consistent estimates of the β4’s, (σ4ρ̃1), (σ4ρ̃2), (σ4ρ̃3), and (σ4ρ̃4).
2 The
selectivity correction within the multinomial logit setup involves all correlation coeffi-
cients between the disturbance term of the earnings equation (µ4) and the disturbance
terms of all categorical latent expressions (η∗s for s = 1, ..., 4).
In terms of practical implementation, the method consists of two steps. First,
estimate the multinomial logit, and derive from it the predicted probabilities P̂s’s
using the γ̂s’s. The integrals m (Ps) have no analytical solution as functions of Ps, so
they must be computed numerically. This is not a source of computational complexity,
however, as it must be done only once for each observation. In the Stata ado program
Bourguignon et al. (2001) compute these numerical integrals using the Gauss-Laguerre
quadrature method. The abscissas and weight factors used in the program are from
Davis & Polonsky (1964). Second, estimate Equation B.15 by ordinary least squares.
2Note that in the second stage, if one is interested in the values of ρ̃1, ρ̃2, ρ̃3, and ρ̃4, full
identification is provided by estimating σ4 from the residuals of the earnings equation (Equation





C.1 Map of India
Figure C.1: Map of India
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C.2 Tables
Table C.1: India in Comparative Perspective, 1999
Country Population Per Capita Illiteracy
Income Rate
(billion) (U.S.$) Male Female
South Asia 1.4 450.00 33 56
Low Income Countries 2.5 430.00 28 46
India 1.0 460.00 31 54
Source: World Development Indicators, 1999.
Illiteracy Rate: Percentage of illiterates in the age group 15 years and above.
South Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, as defined by the World Bank. Low-income countries
are defined by the World Bank as those with a per capita income of US $745
or less.
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Table C.2: Child Labor, Illiteracy Rate, and Gross Primary Enrollment Ratio, by
Income Group and Region, 1999
Category Child Illiteracy Primary
Labor Rate Enrollment
Income Group
Low Income 21 46 86
Lower Middle Income 8 16 115
Upper Middle Income 9 12 104
High Income 0 0 103
Region
East Asia & Pacific 10 16 120
Europe & Central Asia 4 4 99
Latin America & Caribbean 9 13 105
Middle East & North Africa 5 38 98
South Asia 16 49 90
Sub-Saharan Africa 30 12 76
India 14 47 97
World 13 26 102
Source: World Development Indicators, 1999.
Child Labor: Proportion of children aged 10-14 that are employed. Primary
Enrollment: Proportion of children enrolled in primary school. These figures
are reported for 1990.
Table C.3: Regional and Social Disparities in Literacy Rates in India, 2001
Region/State/Caste Gender
Male Female Total
Urban 86.42 72.99 80.06
Rural 71.18 46.58 59.21
Kerala 94.20 87.86 90.92
Bihar 60.32 33.57 47.53
Scheduled Castes 49.91 23.76 37.41
Scheduled Tribes 40.65 18.10 29.60
India 75.64 54.03 65.20





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.11: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Dependent Variables
ChildLabor − ftpt 0.2926 0.4550
School − ftpt 0.6522 0.4763
ChildLabor − ft 0.2643 0.4409
School − ft 0.6271 0.4836
ChildLabor&School − pt 0.0251 0.1564
Independent Variables
Rate− Primary 0.0384 0.0698
Rate−Middle 0.0587 0.1514
Rate−High 0.1288 0.1753
Rate− College 0.1175 0.1741
Y ear − 83 0.2726 0.4453
Y ear − 88 0.2714 0.4447
Y ear − 93 0.2212 0.4151
Y ear − 99 0.2348 0.4238
Children 4.0250 1.7634
Father −None 0.5321 0.4990
Father − Primary 0.1485 0.3556
Father −Middle 0.1289 0.3351
Father −High 0.1333 0.3399
Father − College 0.0572 0.2322
Mother −None 0.7409 0.4381
Mother − Primary 0.1052 0.3068
Mother −Middle 0.0755 0.2643
Mother −High 0.0587 0.2351









July − Sep 0.2492 0.4325
Oct−Dec 0.2523 0.4343
Jan−March 0.2476 0.4316
April − June 0.2509 0.4335
Male 0.5287 0.4992
Source: NSSO Data, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1999.
Per capita monthly household expenditure (LogExpenditure) is adjusted to
1988 Rupees.
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Table C.12: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
(Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0358 0.1081 -0.4042 0.1723**
Rate−Middle -0.1014 0.0527* 0.0498 0.0797
Y ear − 88 0.2824 0.0244*** 0.0009 0.0158
Y ear − 93 0.2284 0.0248*** 0.0020 0.0174
Y ear − 99 0.2021 0.0222*** 0.0402 0.0166**
Children 0.0205 0.0037*** 0.0036 0.0011***
Father − Primary -0.1107 0.0058*** 0.0074 0.0054
Father −Middle -0.1420 0.0070*** 0.0063 0.0062
Father −High -0.1750 0.0085*** 0.0252 0.0067***
Father − College -0.1763 0.0097*** 0.0067 0.0115
Mother − Primary -0.0998 0.0061*** 0.0703 0.0082***
Mother −Middle -0.0908 0.0087*** 0.0760 0.0099***
Mother −High -0.0685 0.0150*** 0.0866 0.0129***
Mother − College -0.0476 0.0177** 0.0948 0.0187***
WorkingMother 0.0630 0.0070*** -0.0225 0.0062***
LogExpenditure -0.0784 0.0075*** 0.0046 0.0053
Asset -0.0070 0.0075 -0.0155 0.0056***
Age -0.1567 0.0151*** -0.0302 0.0046***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0797 0.0062*** 0.0318 0.0062***
Lowcaste 0.0514 0.0058*** 0.0020 0.0046
Muslim 0.0563 0.0108*** 0.0034 0.0076
Oct−Dec -0.0051 0.0059 -0.0031 0.0052
Jan−March -0.0204 0.0062*** -0.0036 0.0051





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.13: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling
(Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.1031 0.1119 0.5693 0.1540***
Rate−Middle 0.0174 0.0439 0.1168 0.0591**
Y ear − 88 0.0491 0.0142*** -0.0185 0.0225
Y ear − 93 0.1432 0.0135*** -0.0077 0.0221
Y ear − 99 0.1903 0.0111*** -0.0547 0.0208***
Children 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0012
Father − Primary 0.1480 0.0044*** -0.0201 0.0048***
Father −Middle 0.1856 0.0049*** -0.0151 0.0061**
Father −High 0.2207 0.0070*** -0.0221 0.0066***
Father − College 0.2274 0.0075*** -0.0168 0.0131
Mother − Primary 0.1308 0.0057*** -0.0737 0.0088
Mother −Middle 0.1377 0.0067*** -0.0894 0.0111
Mother −High 0.1250 0.0097*** -0.0812 0.0136
Mother − College 0.1226 0.0162*** -0.1180 0.0252
WorkingMother -0.0788 0.0073*** 0.0401 0.0076
LogExpenditure 0.1277 0.0059*** -0.0112 0.0062*
Asset 0.0113 0.007 0.0220 0.0057***
Age 0.2619 0.0092*** 0.0335 0.0046***
Agesq -0.0135 0.0003*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1104 0.0086*** -0.0517 0.0080***
Lowcaste -0.0633 0.0062*** -0.0066 0.0058
Muslim -0.1041 0.0117*** -0.0095 0.0092
Oct−Dec -0.0100 0.0051* -0.0041 0.0054
Jan−March 0.0086 0.0052 -0.0009 0.0048





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.14: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
(Without Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Standard Error Interaction Standard Error
with Male Dummy
Rate− Primary -0.0358 0.0173** -0.4042 0.0311***
Rate−Middle -0.1014 0.0079*** 0.0498 0.0131***
Y ear − 88 0.2824 0.0032*** 0.0009 0.0040
Y ear − 93 0.2284 0.0036*** 0.0020 0.0045
Y ear − 99 0.2021 0.0037*** 0.0402 0.0048***
Children 0.0205 0.0005*** 0.0036 0.0007***
Father − Primary -0.1107 0.0023*** 0.0074 0.0042*
Father −Middle -0.1420 0.0024*** 0.0063 0.0049
Father −High -0.1750 0.0025*** 0.0252 0.0059***
Father − College -0.1763 0.0035*** 0.0067 0.0096
Mother − Primary -0.0998 0.0030*** 0.0703 0.0061***
Mother −Middle -0.0908 0.0039*** 0.0760 0.0078***
Mother −High -0.0685 0.0053*** 0.0866 0.0099***
Mother − College -0.0476 0.0098*** 0.0948 0.0178***
WorkingMother 0.0630 0.0023*** -0.0225 0.0029***
LogExpenditure -0.0784 0.0021*** 0.0046 0.0030
Asset -0.0070 0.0025*** -0.0155 0.0034***
Age -0.1567 0.0026*** -0.0302 0.0036***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0001*** 0.0006 0.0001***
Urban -0.0797 0.0025*** 0.0318 0.0039***
Lowcaste 0.0514 0.0024*** 0.0020 0.0032
Muslim 0.0563 0.0032*** 0.0034 0.0041
Oct−Dec -0.0051 0.0027* -0.0031 0.0038
Jan−March -0.0204 0.0027*** -0.0036 0.0039





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Standard errors, not corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.15: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling
(Without Correcting Standard Errors for Clustering)
Variable All Children Standard Error Interaction Standard Error
with Male Dummy
Rate− Primary -0.1031 0.0193*** 0.5693 0.0343***
Rate−Middle 0.0174 0.0089* 0.1168 0.0143***
Y ear − 88 0.0491 0.0029*** -0.0185 0.0042***
Y ear − 93 0.1432 0.0028*** -0.0077 0.0047
Y ear − 99 0.1903 0.0027*** -0.0547 0.0051***
Children 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0008
Father − Primary 0.1480 0.0025*** -0.0201 0.0046***
Father −Middle 0.1856 0.0025*** -0.0151 0.0054***
Father −High 0.2207 0.0027*** -0.0221 0.0064***
Father − College 0.2274 0.0037*** -0.0168 0.0114
Mother − Primary 0.1308 0.0033*** -0.0737 0.0065***
Mother −Middle 0.1377 0.0042*** -0.0894 0.0088***
Mother −High 0.1250 0.0057*** -0.0812 0.0116***
Mother − College 0.1226 0.0108*** -0.1180 0.0224***
WorkingMother -0.0788 0.0025*** 0.0401 0.0031***
LogExpenditure 0.1277 0.0024*** -0.0112 0.0033***
Asset 0.0113 0.0028*** 0.0220 0.0037***
Age 0.2619 0.0029*** 0.0335 0.0040***
Agesq -0.0135 0.0001*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1104 0.0027*** -0.0517 0.0042***
Lowcaste -0.0633 0.0027*** -0.0066 0.0036*
Muslim -0.1041 0.0036*** -0.0095 0.0045**
Oct−Dec -0.0100 0.0031*** -0.0041 0.0043
Jan−March 0.0086 0.0031*** -0.0009 0.0043





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Standard errors, not corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.16: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
(Excluding Domestic Chores from Child Labor)
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0687 0.0875 -0.2198 0.1528
Rate−Middle -0.1108 0.0403*** 0.0984 0.0652
Y ear − 88 0.3781 0.0277*** -0.0733 0.0108***
Y ear − 93 0.3415 0.0276*** -0.0740 0.0106***
Y ear − 99 0.3426 0.0275*** -0.0644 0.0110***
Children 0.0217 0.0032*** -0.0002 0.0009
Father − Primary -0.0834 0.0046*** -0.0079 0.0044*
Father −Middle -0.1043 0.0057*** -0.0142 0.0050***
Father −High -0.1238 0.0076*** -0.0115 0.0058*
Father − College -0.1208 0.0090*** -0.0354 0.0088***
Mother − Primary -0.0654 0.0055*** 0.0291 0.0065***
Mother −Middle -0.0542 0.0082*** 0.0257 0.0074***
Mother −High -0.0367 0.0132*** 0.0387 0.0097***
Mother − College -0.0257 0.0156 0.0514 0.0159***
WorkingMother 0.0646 0.0084*** -0.0289 0.0066***
LogExpenditure -0.0603 0.0069*** -0.0029 0.0052
Asset -0.0004 0.0066 -0.0217 0.0046***
Age -0.1174 0.0090*** -0.0528 0.0068***
Agesq 0.0053 0.0003*** 0.0034 0.0003***
Urban -0.0537 0.0050*** 0.0145 0.0048***
Lowcaste 0.0437 0.0052*** -0.0012 0.0041
Muslim 0.0334 0.0106*** 0.0149 0.0072**
Oct−Dec -0.0010 0.0062 -0.0046 0.0052
Jan−March -0.0076 0.0068 -0.0101 0.0043**





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.17: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time Child Labor
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary 0.0147 0.0840 -0.2857 0.1419**
Rate−Middle -0.0488 0.0405 -0.0193 0.0625
Y ear − 88 0.2857 0.0203*** -0.0013 0.0146
Y ear − 93 0.1839 0.0234*** -0.0040 0.0171
Y ear − 99 0.1331 0.0198*** 0.0312 0.0148**
Children -0.0006 0.0011 0.0009 0.0010
Father − Primary -0.1003 0.0051*** 0.0034 0.0047
Father −Middle -0.1321 0.0060*** 0.0024 0.0055
Father −High -0.1606 0.0072*** 0.0144 0.0060**
Father − College -0.1631 0.0081*** 0.0112 0.0123
Mother − Primary -0.1032 0.0042*** 0.0639 0.0080***
Mother −Middle -0.1117 0.0058*** 0.0778 0.0108***
Mother −High -0.1083 0.0080*** 0.0880 0.0134***
Mother − College -0.1074 0.0113*** 0.1137 0.0236***
WorkingMother 0.0564 0.0057*** -0.0210 0.0057***
LogExpenditure -0.0852 0.0071*** -0.0018 0.0048
Asset -0.0053 0.0064 -0.0146 0.0053***
Age -0.1527 0.0150*** -0.0297 0.0042***
Agesq 0.0087 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0744 0.0055*** 0.0298 0.0061***
Lowcaste 0.0448 0.0057*** 0.0044 0.0046
Muslim 0.0745 0.0090*** 0.0077 0.0068
Oct−Dec 0.0129 0.0038*** 0.0020 0.0049
Jan−March 0.0029 0.0039 0.0027 0.0046





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.18: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time Schooling
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0498 0.1408 0.7079 0.1893***
Rate−Middle 0.0710 0.0607 0.0437 0.0787
Y ear − 88 0.0624 0.0224*** -0.0246 0.0226
Y ear − 93 0.1123 0.0205*** -0.0178 0.0217
Y ear − 99 0.1385 0.0222*** -0.0666 0.0212***
Children -0.0229 0.0044*** -0.0025 0.0012**
Father − Primary 0.1551 0.0056*** -0.0233 0.0051***
Father −Middle 0.1908 0.0071*** -0.0192 0.0065***
Father −High 0.2300 0.0095*** -0.0345 0.0069***
Father − College 0.2356 0.0107*** -0.0130 0.0121
Mother − Primary 0.1220 0.0076*** -0.0761 0.0089***
Mother −Middle 0.1056 0.0104*** -0.0814 0.0103***
Mother −High 0.0684 0.0175*** -0.0784 0.0130***
Mother − College 0.0362 0.0224 -0.0895 0.0198***
WorkingMother -0.0791 0.0086*** 0.0380 0.0079***
LogExpenditure 0.1120 0.0080*** -0.0148 0.0063**
Asset 0.0104 0.0084 0.0216 0.0061***
Age 0.2548 0.0096*** 0.0329 0.0048***
Agesq -0.0131 0.0004*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1104 0.0095*** -0.0494 0.0080***
Lowcaste -0.0661 0.0069*** -0.0046 0.0058
Muslim -0.0795 0.0143*** -0.0055 0.0097
Oct−Dec 0.0106 0.0073 0.0004 0.0059
Jan−March 0.0350 0.0072*** 0.0041 0.0053





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.19: Probit Estimates for Participation in Part Time Child Labor & Schooling
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0011 0.0008 -0.0011 0.0013
Rate−Middle -0.0011 0.0004*** 0.0013 0.0008*
Y ear − 88 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0002
Y ear − 93 0.0455 0.0145*** -0.0004 0.0001**
Y ear − 99 0.0626 0.0163*** -0.0004 0.0001**
Children 0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Father − Primary 0.0003 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000
Father −Middle 0.0004 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000***
Father −High 0.0002 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Father − College 0.0002 0.0001*** -0.0002 0.0000**
Mother − Primary 0.0004 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000***
Mother −Middle 0.0005 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0000**
Mother −High 0.0008 0.0002*** -0.0001 0.0000
Mother − College 0.0013 0.0004*** -0.0001 0.0000
WorkingMother 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
LogExpenditure 0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Asset -0.0001 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000
Age 0.0002 0.0000*** -0.0001 0.0000**
Agesq 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000**
Urban -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Lowcaste 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000***
Muslim -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Oct−Dec -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000
Jan−March -0.0005 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.20: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
- Excluding LogExpenditure
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0402 0.1078 -0.4080 0.1724**
Rate−Middle -0.1021 0.0527* 0.0548 0.0794
Y ear − 88 0.2592 0.0240*** 0.0026 0.0158
Y ear − 93 0.1987 0.0242*** 0.0035 0.0171
Y ear − 99 0.1572 0.0221*** 0.0412 0.0166**
Children 0.0237 0.0037*** 0.0035 0.0010***
Father − Primary -0.1173 0.0059*** 0.0078 0.0053
Father −Middle -0.1510 0.0072*** 0.0070 0.0062
Father −High -0.1883 0.0086*** 0.0262 0.0064***
Father − College -0.1922 0.0093*** 0.0080 0.0109
Mother − Primary -0.1057 0.0062*** 0.0709 0.0082***
Mother −Middle -0.1001 0.0088*** 0.0774 0.0098***
Mother −High -0.0868 0.0144*** 0.0884 0.0125***
Mother − College -0.0840 0.0162*** 0.0975 0.0179***
WorkingMother 0.0689 0.0070*** -0.0227 0.0061***
Asset -0.0135 0.0074* -0.0141 0.0057**
Age -0.1566 0.0150*** -0.0304 0.0046***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0914 0.0060*** 0.0327 0.0061***
Lowcaste 0.0614 0.0064*** 0.0020 0.0047
Muslim 0.0587 0.0109*** 0.0036 0.0076
Oct−Dec -0.0055 0.0061 -0.0036 0.0052
Jan−March -0.0212 0.0062*** -0.0038 0.0051





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.21: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling
- Excluding LogExpenditure
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0937 0.1113 0.5789 0.1561***
Rate−Middle 0.0195 0.0439 0.1085 0.0596*
Y ear − 88 0.0775 0.0138*** -0.0217 0.0225
Y ear − 93 0.1742 0.0124*** -0.0105 0.0219
Y ear − 99 0.2352 0.0101*** -0.0568 0.0212***
Children -0.0043 0.0015*** -0.0008 0.0011
Father − Primary 0.1579 0.0044*** -0.0208 0.0046***
Father −Middle 0.1991 0.0049*** -0.0166 0.0058***
Father −High 0.2407 0.0067*** -0.0245 0.0063***
Father − College 0.2489 0.0065*** -0.0193 0.0122
Mother − Primary 0.1401 0.0057*** -0.0752 0.0088***
Mother −Middle 0.1513 0.0066*** -0.0912 0.0109***
Mother −High 0.1507 0.0089*** -0.0850 0.0133***
Mother − College 0.1694 0.0128*** -0.1219 0.0241***
WorkingMother -0.0876 0.0073*** 0.0403 0.0074***
Asset 0.0213 0.0071*** 0.0197 0.0057***
Age 0.2601 0.0091*** 0.0341 0.0045***
Agesq -0.0133 0.0003*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1276 0.0081*** -0.0532 0.0081***
Lowcaste -0.0789 0.0067*** -0.0070 0.0058
Muslim -0.1067 0.0116*** -0.0100 0.0092
Oct−Dec -0.0090 0.0052* -0.0034 0.0054
Jan−March 0.0104 0.0053* -0.0007 0.0048





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.22: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Child Labor
- Including Rates of Return to High School & College
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0145 0.1071 -0.5241 0.2092**
Rate−Middle -0.0861 0.0528 0.0475 0.0818
Rate−High 0.0342 0.0367 0.1215 0.1282
Rate− College 0.0244 0.0358 0.1217 0.0964
Y ear − 88 0.2812 0.0242*** 0.0054 0.0163
Y ear − 93 0.2300 0.0245*** -0.0082 0.0185
Y ear − 99 0.2000 0.0221*** 0.0295 0.0189
Children 0.0203 0.0037*** 0.0038 0.0011***
Father − Primary -0.1110 0.0057*** 0.0081 0.0054
Father −Middle -0.1423 0.0069*** 0.0070 0.0061
Father −High -0.1751 0.0085*** 0.0251 0.0065***
Father − College -0.1763 0.0097*** 0.0064 0.0112
Mother − Primary -0.1002 0.0061*** 0.0714 0.0083***
Mother −Middle -0.0915 0.0086*** 0.0771 0.0100***
Mother −High -0.0691 0.0150*** 0.0875 0.0128***
Mother − College -0.0482 0.0176** 0.0957 0.0186***
WorkingMother 0.0636 0.0070*** -0.0240 0.0064***
LogExpenditure -0.0783 0.0075*** 0.0048 0.0053
Asset -0.0079 0.0075 -0.0143 0.0056**
Age -0.1566 0.0151*** -0.0302 0.0047***
Agesq 0.0089 0.0005*** 0.0006 0.0002***
Urban -0.0793 0.0062*** 0.0308 0.0064***
Lowcaste 0.0505 0.0058*** 0.0036 0.0048
Muslim 0.0560 0.0110*** 0.0035 0.0079
Oct−Dec -0.0051 0.0059 -0.0029 0.0051
Jan−March -0.0204 0.0062*** -0.0034 0.0049





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.
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Table C.23: Probit Estimates for Participation in Full Time or Part Time Schooling
- Including Rates of Return to High School & College
Variable All Children Robust Interaction Robust
Standard Error with Male Dummy Standard Error
Rate− Primary -0.0755 0.1175 0.5590 0.1664***
Rate−Middle 0.0300 0.0450 0.1118 0.0651*
Rate−High 0.0307 0.0280 -0.0592 0.0773
Rate− College 0.0184 0.0288 -0.0193 0.0613
Y ear − 88 0.0479 0.0147*** -0.0177 0.0228
Y ear − 93 0.1442 0.0121*** -0.0072 0.0194
Y ear − 99 0.1884 0.0113*** -0.0508 0.0218**
Children 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0012
Father − Primary 0.1477 0.0044*** -0.0196 0.0048***
Father −Middle 0.1854 0.0049*** -0.0147 0.0060**
Father −High 0.2206 0.0069*** -0.0217 0.0066***
Father − College 0.2273 0.0075*** -0.0163 0.0132
Mother − Primary 0.1306 0.0057*** -0.0733 0.0088***
Mother −Middle 0.1376 0.0068*** -0.0889 0.0110***
Mother −High 0.1247 0.0097*** -0.0806 0.0134***
Mother − College 0.1222 0.0162*** -0.1171 0.0252***
WorkingMother -0.0786 0.0073*** 0.0397 0.0076***
LogExpenditure 0.1285 0.0059*** -0.0127 0.0061**
Asset 0.0114 0.0069* 0.0218 0.0054***
Age 0.2619 0.0092*** 0.0334 0.0046***
Agesq -0.0135 0.0003*** -0.0009 0.0002***
Urban 0.1105 0.0086*** -0.0521 0.0081***
Lowcaste -0.0630 0.0063*** -0.0073 0.0059
Muslim -0.1048 0.0118*** -0.0084 0.0092
Oct−Dec -0.0101 0.0052* -0.0039 0.0054
Jan−March 0.0086 0.0052 -0.0008 0.0047





Marginal effects of independent variables and interactions of all independent variables with the male dummy
are reported. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the year-state level: *Significant at 10%,












































































































































































































































Table C.25: Tariff Rates in Manufacturing, 1990-1999
Industry 1990 1992 1997 1999 Decrease
Food Products 85.15 47.47 28.32 31.47 63.04
Beverages 190.71 181.9 124.76 116.67 38.82
Tobacco 100.00 65.00 40.00 40.00 60.00
Textiles 93.88 62.08 38.05 38.36 59.14
Wearing Apparel (Except Footwear) 99.84 64.98 39.88 39.92 60.02
Leather Products 82.13 55.32 19.36 29.79 63.73
Footwear (Except Rubber or Plastic) 100.00 65.00 40.00 40.00 60.00
Wood Products (Except Furniture) 64.57 60.11 30.21 33.19 48.60
Furniture (Except Metal) 100.00 65.00 40.00 40.00 60.00
Paper and Paper Products 90.48 58.45 23.47 31.94 64.70
Printing and Publishing 59.26 24.07 20.74 22.96 61.26
Industrial Chemicals 77.09 63.43 29.07 33.99 55.91
Other Chemicals 82.75 58.90 31.60 35.30 57.34
Petroleum Refineries 49.78 48.70 30.00 33.26 33.19
Miscellaneous Petroleum and Coal Products 70.00 53.75 27.50 28.75 58.93
Rubber Products 95.00 63.37 39.26 40.00 57.89
Plastic Products 100.69 64.90 31.67 35.20 65.04
Pottery, Chine, Earthenware 85.71 65.00 37.14 37.86 55.83
Glass and Glass Products 93.03 64.10 39.34 39.26 57.80
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 84.75 62.85 38.42 38.04 55.12
Iron and Steel 84.55 64.77 28.55 33.97 59.82
Nonferrous Metals 73.93 58.28 26.25 30.82 58.31
Fabricated Metal Products 75.00 59.87 29.83 32.54 56.61
Machinery (Except Electrical) 78.06 48.70 22.95 26.89 65.55
Electrical Machinery 81.95 57.73 31.29 31.48 61.59
Transport Equipment 62.76 52.72 31.12 35.61 43.26
Professional and Scientific Equipment 73.63 57.99 28.47 30.61 58.43
Other Manufactured Products 102.51 57.99 34.56 35.03 65.83
Source: UNCTAD.
The decrease in tariff rates from 1990 to 1999 is in percentage points.
Table C.26: Selected Indicators of India’s External Sector, 1980-2000
Indicator 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Imports of goods and services (% GDP) 9.32 8.38 9.76 14.07 16.56
Exports of goods and services (% GDP) 6.04 5.51 7.14 10.90 13.95
Trade of goods and services (% GDP) 15.36 13.89 16.90 24.97 30.51
Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.59 0.85
Source: World Development Indicators, various years.
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Table C.27: Machinery Imports, 1988-2000
Year Machinery Imports Machinery Imports















Table C.28: Machinery Imports from Trading Partners (%), 1988-2000
Year USA Japan Germany Other Partners
1988 16.4 23.1 15.0 45.5
1989 16.5 19.2 13.6 50.7
1990 16.0 20.1 15.7 48.2
1991 17.5 21.3 18.1 44.6
1992 16.9 21.1 18.2 43.8
1993 28.4 15.7 15.8 40.1
1994 22.0 15.9 16.1 46.0
1995 18.2 14.8 19.2 47.8
1996 19.6 14.5 16.8 49.1
1997 17.6 16.5 14.5 51.4
1998 16.2 14.6 12.7 56.5
1999 13.9 17.4 10.7 58.0
2000 16.1 11.5 10.6 61.8
Source: COMTRADE
Other Partners include the United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Singapore, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea.
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Table C.29: Hours Spent & Number of Individuals by Employment Status: 1983-1999
Year Status Women Men
Hours Number Hours Number
1983 Non-Participants 6582972 144601 1886172 61252
Unemployed 236416 7269 633248 20182
Self-Employed 1322144 33311 4229896 106838
Regular Wage/Salary 852372 21005 2798716 64876
1988 Non-Participants 7173416 156764 2172100 67765
Unemployed 228372 6910 622664 18574
Self-Employed 1472844 37372 4759364 122948
Regular Wage/Salary 594744 14041 1553888 34553
1993 Non-Participants 6297852 142431 1862520 50528
Unemployed 157788 4545 418296 12322
Self-Employed 1431540 39141 4133384 103054
Regular Wage/Salary 809340 19677 2750100 62572
1999 Non-Participants 6989320 158607 2234580 65340
Unemployed 173232 5090 524000 15898
Self-Employed 1418184 40018 4213236 107081
Regular Wage/Salary 879244 21634 2999972 68956
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